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Technical Report No. 298

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL
COMPETITION OF INTEREST AMONG THE
MAJOR POWERS.

Volume III. Analysis of Soviet Patterns
of External Interests.

by

J. S. Breemer and M. E. Miller

30 April 1976

Prepared for
Director, Special Regional Programs
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of Defense
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SUMMARY

1. This is Volume III of the final report on the research project entitled Analysis and Evaluation of a Potential Competition of Interest Among the Major Powers. The work is being performed for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation), Director, Special Regional Programs, under Contract No. MDA 930-75-C-0225.

2. This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the scope and character of the Soviet interest as manifested in observable patterns of external involvement. Although the Soviet Union constitutes only one of the five major foreign international actors being examined, the importance of its worldwide role in U.S. defense planning justified a more extensive analytic treatment than has been accorded to the other four powers, i.e., France, Great Britain, Japan, and West Germany.

APPROACH

3. A systematic analysis of the phenomenon of international competition, using empirical data to the fullest extent feasible, requires an interlocking series of conceptual and methodological building blocks. One of the most crucial steps is the operationalization of the concept of the national interest so that it may be measured and subjected to systematic analysis.

4. This study operationalized the Soviet interest abroad as the observable network of military, political, and economic activities that combine to express the scope and character of Soviet foreign involvement. Twenty-three different indicators of Soviet involvement abroad across one hundred and twenty-three countries were collected and analyzed over a 6-year time span (1968-1973) in an effort to systematically define the dimensional profile of the Soviet interest abroad.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

5. Routine patterns of international involvement, e.g., trade or foreign aid programs rather than ideal long-range national goals or aspirations, tend to be the primary reference

point in most foreign policy decisions. An explicit delineation of the character and scope of nondramatic, regularized patterns of manifest Soviet involvement in the international system can provide the U.S. policymaker with at least one explicit measure of Soviet geographic policy priorities.

6. Using R-factor analysis and orthogonal rotation, 23 discrete political, military, and economic measures of Soviet external involvement were reduced to a six-dimensional profile, or model, of Soviet manifest interest. Based on the interrelationships and identity of the 23 variables involved, each of the six dimensions was assigned a descriptive label, e.g., Military Assistance, which is composed of security assistance, military sales, defense budget support, and other variables. The resulting six-dimensional profiles suggested that the pattern of Soviet external involvement is not characterized by the kind of cohesiveness that it is frequently claimed to possess.

7. One hundred and twenty-three countries were scored according to their value on each of the six dimensions, as well as across all six dimensions combined for the years 1968 to 1973. In this way, an explicitly arrived at, systematic ranking of most countries in the international system from the perspective of the Soviet Union was obtained. Four basic patterns of Soviet involvement were uncovered: a highly stable pattern in countries along the Soviet periphery; a steady trend toward increasing involvement in countries such as Syria and Guinea; a declining level of involvement in Egypt, Cuba, Sudan, and North Yemen; and, finally, a cyclical pattern of activity in countries such as Algeria, Turkey, and the Congo.

8. Since completion of this report, the Soviet data file has been updated through the year 1974 and is available for analysis as of this date.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This is Volume III of the final report on a study entitled Analysis and Evaluation of Potential Competition of Interest Among the Major Powers. The work is being performed for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation), Director, Special Regional Programs, under Contract No. MDA 930-75-C-0225. The particular focus of this report is on the analysis of the Soviet Union data base, its utilization as a comprehensive resource to examine patterns of Soviet worldwide involvement, and the implications of the patterns uncovered for U.S. security planning. Six years (1968-1973) of empirical evidence of Soviet external involvement in 135 countries have been subjected to statistical analysis in an effort to uncover whatever systematic interrelationships exist among its various discrete manifestations. The resulting model of the Soviet Union's manifest interests abroad is believed to contribute significantly to the ability of the policy analyst to examine geographic priorities in Soviet foreign policy in a systematic manner.

BACKGROUND

1.2 Prudent defense planning must take account of the interests and commitments of both allies and adversaries. A failure to do so may result in otherwise avoidable diplomatic or military crises or, conversely, may obscure opportunities for new policy initiatives.

1.3 The generally competitive character of the U.S.-Soviet relationship makes it particularly important that the rational allocation of U.S. defense resources in support of effective foreign policy be based on a deliberate estimate of the Soviet perception of its own interests and involvements throughout the international system. A decision to commit or reduce U.S. power in local or regional areas must include an assessment of the extent and character of Soviet international engagements, including the likelihood that an added increment of U.S. resources may spur intensified competition between the two superpowers and possibly precipitate a diplomatic or military confrontation.

1.4 One useful measure of a nation's perception of its interests abroad is the nature and level of its foreign involvements, both public and private. For example, the dollar value of U.S. trade may be taken as a reasonably accurate indicator of the U.S. interest in international stability in different parts of the world, while, alternatively, a billion dollar Soviet military assistance program to Syria must be viewed as a reliable manifestation of a substantial Soviet military stake.

1.5 Aid and trade, expressed in dollars, are only two of a variety of manifest stakes that, in the aggregate, comprise the sum total of a power's foreign interests. Some of these, e.g., trade flows, international investments, or the number of nationals that reside abroad, are discrete interests in and of themselves. Others, such as military aid, development assistance, or cultural exchange programs, qualify primarily

as partial indicators of broader, frequently intangible interests, such as security, the extension of political influence, or the denial of both to other nations. The present study is based on the premise that a systematic collection and examination of a representative set of interest-indicator data can produce a valid model of the totality of a country's interests worldwide.

1.6 Included in the overall study are six major international actors: France, Great Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, West Germany, and the U.S. All six participate to some extent in international politics on a worldwide scale; i.e., these countries maintain substantial interests beyond their immediate regional areas and, consequently, are concerned with and attempt to influence events far beyond their respective national frontiers.

1.7 The intersection of the multiple interests of different great powers is unavoidable. The opportunity for uninterrupted imperialist expansion into uncharted areas of the world that prevailed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries no longer exists. Instead, no area in the world remains unclaimed today. Each of the almost 200 sovereign nations in the world has become an integral part of the international system; each is a part of a regularized worldwide commercial exchange system; each participates in formalized diplomatic intercourse; and each country relates, in one form or another (as an ally, adversary, or even a neutral) to the superpowers.

1.8 The configuration of commercial trade flows, diplomatic loyalties, and other bilateral forms of international relationships marks the prevailing distribution of the great powers' interests throughout the international system. This distribution is a relative phenomenon; its alteration must necessarily involve a gain by one power at the expense of another. Thus for one nation to increase its commodity market share, another must undergo a reduction, even though both may in fact have gained in absolute terms. Similarly, political influence can only be gained to the detriment of other influence-seeking nations. Finally, it has long been regarded as true that the search for security by one nation necessarily implies the insecurity of others.

1.9 Nation-states measure their position in the world relative to their competitors' share of international valuables, such as power, influence, raw resources, or export markets. Since no absolute criterion exists for measuring "adequate" levels of international influence, security, or national wealth, nation-states perceive themselves in a constant state of competition with each other to improve their condition in relation to others. Indeed, many thoughtful students of international politics view rivalry among nation-states as the very essence of an international system that is divided into numerous autonomous national decision-making units.

1.10 International competition for scarce political or economic resources is observable in the expanding and contracting foreign engagements and activities by the major powers. Commercial rivalry, for example, can be gauged by comparing trends in relative overseas market shares, while one good indicator

of political competition is the relative amounts of national resources different donor nations are prepared to contribute to a third nation's economic development.

1.11 The scope of a nation's involvement abroad is determined to a very large degree by the national capabilities or resources it is able to marshal. A \$100 million military assistance program, for example, is a much smaller burden on the U.S. economy than on France's. To evaluate a third country's importance to France and the U.S., for example, in terms of comparative dollar values of French versus U.S. military aid would fail to take into account the "criterion of proportion." A thoughtful estimate should consider French versus U.S. military aid to Country X as a percentage of both countries' worldwide assistance programs.

1.12 A comparative examination of intersecting and competing great power interests must begin by identifying the relative importance of countries from the unique, egocentric perspective of the individual major powers.

PURPOSE

1.13 The objective of the present study was to identify the observable geographic hierarchy of Soviet interests worldwide as it is understood from its manifest international activities. The study does not encompass the full extent of Soviet interests in different areas of the world. The study has simply taken the empirical reality of Soviet involvement (without attempting to impute the rationale behind such involvement) in the belief that this constitutes a reasonably

realistic reflection of the underlying Soviet policy priorities and aspirations in the international system.

1.14 Three immediate research objectives guided this report. First, it is hoped that a systematic study of multiple forms of Soviet international involvement might shed light on the assumed cohesiveness of Soviet foreign policy. It is widely believed that, in contrast with the U.S., the centralized form of the Soviet state mechanism plus the public ownership and control of all national assets help assure that such varied overseas engagements as military and economic aid, trade flows, and cultural exchange programs are joined into a highly integrated, unified complex of foreign policy activities that is designed to accomplish one goal: extend Soviet influence worldwide. In contrast, it is pointed out that the foreign policies of the Western nations are less goal directed and less unified, since they suffer presumably from the built-in divisions between the private and public sectors and the plurality of frequently clashing interests within each of the two sectors. The analytic techniques used in this study were selected purposely to help clarify this important policy question.

1.15 The second study objective was to develop a systematic framework for rank ordering and characterizing 134 countries across a series of explicit indicators of the Soviet interest abroad. This second objective was aimed at defining geographic priorities in Soviet policy planning and identifying the particular mix of policy instruments (e.g., military versus economic aid) that the Soviet Union apparently deems most effective in different areas of the world.

1.16 Finally, the study was designed to investigate observable trends in the distribution of different forms of Soviet involvement in various parts of the world. Specifically, a 6-year history (1968-1973) of Soviet international activities was tested in an effort to isolate distinct patterns of decreasing versus increasing levels of Soviet involvement behavior. The ultimate purpose of this exercise was to establish an explicit baseline for potential U.S. policy initiatives.

APPROACH

1.17 Previous conceptual and methodological experience with the systematic evaluation of U.S. worldwide interests has been used to define data requirements and analytic research techniques. This earlier experience confirmed the usefulness of quantitative data and research techniques to arrive at a systematic and comprehensive description of the U.S. interest abroad as it is reflected in the interrelationships that prevail among private and public U.S. international involvements.

1.18 Clearly, any study is only as good as the data it relies on and the extent to which such data are valid representations of the concepts examined. In this case, the validity of the study hinges on two issues: that the data employed do indeed constitute valid specifications of the concept of the Soviet interest and that the variables selected are, in fact, a representative sample of a potential universe of variables. The latter criterion means that the researcher must be reasonably confident that the conclusions will not be significantly

altered if additional variables were to be included. For example, the study ranked 134 countries in terms of their relative importance as recipients of Soviet military aid based on an aggregation of such variables as the monetary value of Soviet security assistance, arms sales, military advisers, and defense budget support. Conceivably, further research might uncover additional manifestations of Soviet military aid programs, e.g., the number of third country military personnel being trained in the Soviet Union. Given, however, that the original variables used are truly representative of the phenomenon under investigation, i.e., Soviet military aid, the supplemental data should be of no significant consequence to the original rank ordering.

1.19 The present study involved a conscientious effort to establish data requirements that were both comprehensive and achievable, while meeting the requirement of representativeness. The data collection was organized and managed following the typology of international involvements that is typically used in the comparative analysis of foreign policies: political, commercial, and military involvements. It should be stressed that this classification was simply employed as a guide to the data collection process itself and not as an a priori characterization of the discrete components of total Soviet foreign involvement. On the contrary, one of the principal purposes of the investigation was to test and examine the de facto interdependence of these three aspects.

1.20 Once the data had been collected and validated, principal component factor analysis and orthogonal rotation were employed to investigate across all the variables the unique

dimensional structure of Soviet worldwide involvement, with reference to 134 countries. The operational purpose of using factor analytic techniques was to reduce the original multitude of discrete variables (in this case 23) to a smaller, more manageable number of clusters of functionally interdependent variables called factors, components, or dimensions. Use of this procedure also uncovered the distinct patterns of Soviet foreign involvement behavior, which, on the face of the original data themselves, is not generally apparent. Thus, for example, even the most comprehensive cross-national listing of the various manifestations of Soviet military and economic assistance (e.g., equipment deliveries, number of military technicians, development load disbursements, and technical advisory personnel) will fail to reveal with any precision the relationships that may exist among different military assistance activities versus economic aid involvements.

1.21 The rearrangement of the original source data through factor analysis into a series of independent multivariable factors was designed to define whatever interconnections in fact exist among different types of Soviet overseas involvement. A summary discussion of the more important conceptual and technical aspects of factor analysis is contained in Section V of this report.

1.22 Six years of Soviet data were manipulated to test the stability of the Soviet interest profile over time and to investigate possible trends among variable interrelationships that might exist. The results were interpreted with particular reference to the previously developed U.S. interest model.

1.23 Examination of observed Soviet foreign interest priorities was approached by scoring each of the 134 countries on each of the previously defined multivariable dimensions that were found to underlie the 23 variables used. In addition, a composite score was developed so that each country could be assigned a single index of its relative importance from the perspective of the Soviet interest abroad. The technical procedure that was followed is discussed in Section V.

CONTENTS

1.24 Section II further explores the concept that a country's interests abroad may be examined most fruitfully by analyzing the observable and measurable characteristics of its day-to-day international involvements. This is an elaboration of earlier reports in this series, which attempt to systematically identify the scope and character of those involvements. Section III is a cursory overview of the principal international forces that, through time, have tended to influence the scope and character of Soviet initiatives and involvements outside the immediate Eurasian periphery. In Section IV the selection of the indicators used to conceptualize and operationalize the various manifestations of Soviet interest in foreign countries is discussed. The technical procedure followed in this analysis is presented in Section V.

II. CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST

2.1 This section expands on one of the basic premises of this study, i.e., that the scope and character of a country's interests abroad may be examined most fruitfully by analyzing the observable and measurable characteristics of its day-to-day international involvements.

2.2 The most widely used explanation of national interest as a set of abstract national goals or aspirations that should guide foreign policy suffers from a degree of ambiguity and broadness that prevents it from being employed as a useful, analyzable policy construct. Instead, it is argued that for both theoretical and policy-operational reasons, the notion of a country's stake abroad be addressed in terms of the empirically evident structure of its actual involvements--public or private, commercial or military.

NATIONAL INTEREST AS A POLICY CONSTRUCT

2.3 The term "national interest" is simultaneously one of the most omnifarious and least understood concepts in the field of international relations. To numerous analysts it is the self-evident motivation of all international behavior, requiring little, if any, analytic explanation or justification. Morgenthau, in his "realist" theory of international politics, a theory that has influenced the actions and beliefs of a

generation of post-World War II students and American policy-makers, declared that national interest "is the perennial standard by which political action must be judged and directed" and that it is "the essence of politics and is unaffected by circumstances of time and place." ^{1/} Grant Hugo, a prominent British writer, agreed and, quoting Lord Strang, wrote: "Of all the considerations relevant to foreign policy the national interest is most likely to be taken for granted as part of that 'large area of common ground', which 'does not need to be explained or demonstrated.'" ^{2/}

RECENT ATTEMPTS AT CLASSIFYING NATIONAL INTERESTS

2.4 International developments in recent years, in conjunction with the desire by policy analysts to add scientific rigor to the discipline of international relations, have led to a growing awareness that the concept of national interest substantially lacks its supposed self-evident quality. James N. Rosenau has summarized some of the analytic limitations of the concept:

One is the ambiguous nature of the nation and the difficulty of specifying whose interests it encompasses. A second is the elusiveness of criteria for determining the existence of interests and for tracing their presence in substantive politics. Still another confounding factor is the absence

^{1/} Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 8-9.

^{2/} Grant Hugo, Britain in Tomorrow's World: Principles of Foreign Policy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 60.

of procedures for cumulating the interests once they have been identified. This is in turn complicated by uncertainty as to whether the national interest has been fully identified once all the specific interests have been cumulated or whether there are not other, more generalized, values which render the national interest greater than the sum of its parts.^{3/}

2.5 The renewed national awareness of the distinction between the attainable and merely desirable ends of foreign policy has occasioned a flurry of scholarly writings that attempt to systematically break down the national interest concept into categories of relative priorities. Donald E. Nuechterlein, for instance, separated the U.S. national interest into "basic national interests" and "transitory interests." The former he spelled out as the "relatively unchanging national interests" in national defense, the "promotion of U.S. international trade and investment," and a "peaceful international environment."^{4/}

2.6 Transitory interests, according to the author, are "the degree of interest the United States feels in specific issues relating to its three basic national interests, and with the basis for determining which threats are so important to its defense, economic, or world-order interests that it would contemplate the use of armed force to protect them against

^{3/} James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York, The Free Press, 1971, p. 243.

^{4/} Donald E. Nuechterlein, United States National Interests in a Changing World, Lexington, Kentucky, The University Press of Kentucky, 1973, pp. 7-9.

encroachment by a foreign power." ^{5/} (Emphasis added.) Put differently, Neuchterlein used the term transitory to emphasize the varying amounts of attention that certain issues generate at different times from decision-makers; it is used as a perceptual criterion.

2.7 Transitory interests of decreasing importance, Nuechterlein concluded, may be classified as "survival," "vital," "major," or "peripheral" interests, with each tier denoting the prevailing willingness of the government to use military force in its protection. ^{6/}

2.8 Ralph N. Clough spoke of the basic U.S. interests in survival, economic prosperity and "an international environment favorable to these interests." ^{7/} He observed that, while most people agree on the validity of these broad principles, dissension arises over their application, i.e., the circumstances that might justify the use of military force. The author argued for the existence of four "clusters of interest," each of which may be of "such great importance" that, if imperiled, the "use of U.S. forces to protect them must be seriously considered." ^{8/} He labeled the individual clusters "general," "intrinsic," "derived," and "created" interests. General interests, he explained, relate to issues

^{5/} Ibid., p. 10.

^{6/} Ibid., pp. 10-11.

^{7/} Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 28.

^{8/} Ibid., p. 29.

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that impinge on U.S. military security directly. Examples are the U.S. economic stake in a country, traditional ties with foreign peoples, and the contribution of foreign bases to U.S. security.

2.9 Derived interests in particular countries, according to Clough, flow from either general or intrinsic interests in third countries. For example, the initial U.S. interest in Korea stemmed largely from the peninsula's perceived strategic importance to the safety of Japan.

2.10 Finally, Clough used the term created interests to define those policy actions (e.g., the conclusion of a treaty or the deployment of U.S. forces on foreign territory) that create an expectation of U.S. willingness to use force. He observed that though the original rationale for such actions may be forgotten in time, the actions themselves tend to frequently acquire a raison d'être. He wrote:

Once created, such interests are hard to extinguish. Furthermore, they tend to breed other interests. To protect existing interests, new commitments either implicit or express tend to be made in nearby areas. ^{9/}

NATIONAL INTEREST AS AN OPERATIONAL PROBLEM

2.11 Despite these and other writers' attempts to systematically distinguish among the various aspects and priorities

^{9/} Ibid., p. 30.

of the idea of national interest, it is difficult to fit the complexities of day-to-day foreign policy into neat compartments of graduating interests and nearly impossible to systematically formulate and implement foreign policy according to such a set of rigorously defined priorities. Although it is conceptually feasible to separate out the national interest in matters of survival, the interdependence and origins of a host of less-than-survival concerns have frequently become so obscure as to virtually preclude their systematic ranking against some measure of their relative importance to the U.S. interest and, by extension, the U.S. willingness to use military force for their protection.

2.12 Granting the existence of an "objective" interest in national survival, clear demarcation of national interests is further complicated by the widely acknowledged subjective quality of the concept. It is extremely difficult to affirm its existence independent from the actions of national decision-makers. Instead, as Edgar Furniss and Richard Snyder stated 20 years ago: "The national interest is what the nation, i.e., the decision-maker, decides it is." ^{10/}
(Emphasis added.)

2.13 The subjective attribute of the national interest is enhanced by the disputable meaning of the adjective "national." It has been argued quite persuasively that, since only a small minority of the population tends to have any regular

^{10/} Edgar S. Furniss and Richard L. Snyder, An Introduction to American Foreign Policy, New York, Rinehard, 1955, p. 17.

opportunity or inclination to influence the policies of the national government, decisions ostensibly predicated on the national interest tend to consciously or unconsciously reflect the particular concerns of this small minority. Indeed, Ernst Haas and Allen White went so far as to assert that "the concept of the national interest means little more than the claims of other states which correspond to the specific aims of ruling groups." ^{11/} (Emphasis added.)

2.14 This is not to say that the resultant policies are necessarily at variance with the wishes or needs of the population at large. On the contrary, it can be argued, for instance, that the interest on the part of the governing elites in the industrialized countries in "international stability" to secure profitable trade and overseas investment conforms with the masses' interest in economic welfare and that, conversely, instability through conflict or nationalization of property would have the cumulative effect of lowering the general population's standard of living. ^{12/}

^{11/} Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1956, p. 45.

^{12/} This argument, of course, invites the retort that it is incompatible with the national interest to rely on inherently precarious foreign assets in the first place; instead, the national interest demands long-term independence from the unpredictable actions of foreign states. The current call in the U.S. for "energy independence" -- and hence the negation of "oil intervention" -- is an example.

2.15 It seems reasonable to assert that what is generally disposed of as the national interest is, in fact, a complex arrangement of the sometimes conflicting, sometimes complementary demands and desires on the part of multiple, unequally represented domestic interest groups. Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroseke reflected on the "clash of interests" that constitutes the domestic framework for foreign policy:

We see infinitely complex and diverse societies around us, divided not only into "classes" but also into "interest groups," and we constantly observe that the aspirations of these classes and groups conflict. What common denominator can be found between the demands of those Englishmen in 1846 who wanted the Corn Laws upheld, and those of consumers who were lured by Richard Cobden's propaganda in favor of cheap bread? Or between shareholders of a company that supported the conquest or retention of a colony, and the soldiers and their families, who were little disposed to risk death and bereavement for the sake of financial profit? Within one and the same state, contradictions among the interests of groups and individuals is such that one is hard put to admit that objectively a national interest exists. ^{13/} (Emphasis in the original.)

2.16 The often heard criticism that the U.S. (or any country, for that matter) seems to frequently pursue mutually exclusive international objectives, thereby demonstrating the lack of a coherent foreign policy framework, is partially

^{13/} Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroseke, Introduction to the History of International Relations (trans. Mary Ilford), New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 260-61.

explained by this plurality of motives on the part of those who affect the country's overseas activities, rather than by the unity of national interests. It should also be noted that students of international affairs tend to ascribe to other countries purposes and priorities similar to those that are thought to underlie U.S. international behavior, thereby assuming implicitly that the conflux of, for instance, Soviet domestic interests is roughly equivalent to its U.S. counterpart.

2.17 The comparative foreign policy researcher who attempts to distill the notion of the national interest into an operationally useful and analyzable construct is confronted with these dilemmas:

- a. No readily available, operationally relevant outside measure exists for classifying and rank ordering nonsurvival interests. The study of the national interest simply lacks the tools or insights needed to validate a priority list, however carefully compiled, of a country's national interests abroad.
- b. No agreement exists on the dividing line between the national interest and the interests of particular domestic elites or pressure groups. This means that the analyst who takes a "national" view of the national interest risks omitting particular concerns that, under certain circumstances, may constitute a critical driving force behind a nation's foreign policy.

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- c. A widespread confusion prevails in use of the national interest as a general abstraction on the one hand and as a concrete, identifiable activity on the other. For example, the U.S. has an interest in its international investment position because its citizens own overseas property. The U.S. may also have an interest in a continuing rate of return on its overseas investments, because it is on this that the national prosperity may in part depend. The first kind of interest is concrete and empirically verifiable; the second provides a specific motive not necessarily inherent in the first (e.g., the overseas investor may only want to make a tax loss). Moreover, motivations frequently change over time and are therefore much more difficult to verify objectively. The first kind of interest may be termed a concrete stake, while the second may be labeled an abstract attitude.

2.18 These three major complications, which have bedeviled the development of an operationally pertinent national interest concept, suggest that a most fruitful approach may be to limit analysis to the de facto evidence of a nation's overseas activities, rather than a necessarily arbitrary a priori set of preferred national goals and objectives. In a negative sense, this approach has the advantage of avoiding the issues listed above, while at the same time it is supported by a number of practical considerations.

ROUTINE CHARACTER OF MOST FOREIGN POLICY

2.19 Although most governments presumably have a vision of what would constitute a desirable state of international affairs and spend varying amounts of attention in formulating national goals accordingly, most foreign policy appears to possess little relationship to a deliberate attempt at their implementation in a coherent and systematic fashion. One reason for the failure of a consistent, discernible link between national goals and national policy is the lack of specificity that characterizes most (usually broadly stated) national objectives. Michael J. Brower thus concluded the following on the operational guidance provided by announced national goals:

...what do [the goals used] tell us about guiding the nation's foreign policy? Unfortunately, nothing very specific. The goals are all too general, too vague, too subject to varied interpretations and definitions to serve as more than the most general of policy guides. Practically any conceivable policy from appeasement to invading a neighbor to building hydrogen bombs can be and has been carried on by various nations under the banner of one of these terms. ^{14/}

2.20 One foremost theorist of international relations, K. J. Holsti, went one step further when he all but denied the existence of systematic, goal-directed planning by national decision-makers:

^{14/} Michael J. Brower, The U.S. National Interest--Assertions and Definitions, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1959, p. 206.

...we should not assume that foreign ministers and diplomats spend all their time carefully formulating logical and coherent sets of collective or private goals to pursue systematically through the rational ordering of means to ends. [Rather, the] work of a foreign office frequently appears to develop in a completely random fashion, with no discernable relationship between decisions arrived at and policies conducive to the achievement of collective goals. ^{15/}

2.21 Most of the work of foreign ministries and other agencies concerned with the nation's international role is concentrated on routine matters, i.e., the day-to-day protection and furtherance of the country's ongoing participation in the international system. To the ministry of commerce, this year's trade statistics are the national interest; to the defense ministry, the retention of overseas bases are a routine concern; to the foreign ministry, the maintenance of friendly diplomatic relations make up a large part of its activities. Accordingly, contemporary relations with foreign countries tend to be evaluated and acted on in terms of the prevailing state of interaction and not with reference to some set of broad, ideal, long-term goals. Only in times of rapid international change, crisis, or critical domestic developments will the issue of the national interest undergo critical debate, will premises and assumptions be scrutinized, and will a country's international role be reconsidered. It is under these exceptional circumstances that the actuality of national involvement will be measured against the "ideal" purpose of a country's role in the world, criteria and

^{15/} K. J. Holsti, International Politics--A Framework for Analysis, 2d. ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, pp. 131-132.

perceptions other than the routine configuration of international involvements will be brought to bear, and what Rosenau has termed "convention-breaking" policy decisions will be made. ^{16/} In the meantime governments tend to respond to and act on their "real world" interests (i.e., the demands and pressures of their immediate involvements with other countries) rather than to act with reference to some long-range national strategy.

2.22 Evan Luard, a member of the British Parliament, has commented on this phenomenon. Because his statement is pertinent to the issue at hand, it has been cited at length:

The evidence suggests that very many decisions are made without any regard, certainly without conscious regard, to long-term objectives. Probably many governments will rarely formulate explicitly ultimate goals of this type; for this reason alone their influence on officials or statesmen is reduced. Even when there are occasional attempts to formulate such goals, it is unlikely that they have any direct influence, though they may be strengthened as unconscious motives. The decision on how to respond to a particular diplomatic note, how to vote on a particular resolution, whether to ratify a particular convention, and still more the far larger number of smaller decisions that are arrived at within foreign offices every day will be influenced far more by other, and short term objectives.

These more immediate objectives might include the need to retain the friendship of a particular ally; the need to promote relations with a particular country or type of country; the desire not to exacerbate relations with another; the need to promote the interests or cohesion of a particular alliance and to frustrate the interests of another;

^{16/} See James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York, The Free Press, 1971, pp. 292-97.

the need to promote particular, rather than general interests, economic and political, of the nation and its nationals; the need not to offend a particular interest group or governing party at home. Perhaps the most important and common of all such aims is simply the need to respond to the existing situation, to find a way forward from, or a solution to the particular problem or state of affairs immediately faced. Though some of these goals may originally have been related, more or less closely, to the attainment of the long-term objectives, they may increasingly become ends in their own right, pursued without regard to their original instrumental purpose....

Other factors will influence national conduct. The tradition of policies undertaken in the past may continue to exert influence, even though consciously they are no longer regarded as goals. The political sympathies, and personal characteristics of governing groups and officials will exert an influence. Policies influence each other. Sometimes one objective will eliminate another.... Sometimes goals that are contradictory, or at least conflicting will be pursued simultaneously. It is the sum total of the actions of a state that may be taken as evidence of its collective motives. ^{17/} (Emphasis added.)

POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF INTEREST IN ACTION

2.23 The second consideration that supports the use of a country's manifest international occupations as a useful numerator of its national interests is the proposition that national goals do not become politically significant until they have been translated into action. According to

^{17/} Evan Luard, Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System, London, University of London Press, Ltd., 1970, pp. 33-34.

international relations theorist Joseph Frankel: "Values reach their full political significance only in action, when the statesman actively applies them to his image of the environment." ^{18/} Charles A. Beard's observation in his classic text, The Idea of National Interest, echoes this sentiment:

The question--What is the national interest?--can be answered, if at all, only by exploring the use of the formula by responsible statesmen and publicists and by discovering the things and patterns of conduct... embraced within the scope of the formula. ^{19/} (Emphasis added.)

2.24 The substance of diplomatic interaction affirms the political impact of values in action or through conduct, rather than by declaratory fiat. States rarely react to or confront each other over broad declarations of intent alone but, instead, tend to await the evidence of their actual implementation (hence the criticism of so-called "crisis diplomacy"). Indeed, a reverse process appears to prevail, where other countries' objectives and motivations become foremost matters of national concern and inquiry primarily in the wake of observed policy actions. Thus, the Soviet Union's self-proclaimed mission to spread "socialist equality" becomes an active U.S. policy concern to the extent that Moscow's manifest behavior, e.g., in the form of military assistance or economic aid, is perceived as evidence

^{18/} Joseph Frankel, International Relations, 2d. ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 39.

^{19/} Charles A. Beard, The Idea of the National Interest, New York, Macmillan, 1939, p. 20.

of this goal. Indeed, the perceived underlying purpose behind aid extension may be less important than the fact of its provision per se.

2.25 Nation-states, then, tend to define their own and others' situations with reference to the hard evidence of their respective preoccupations and involvements.

APPLICATIONS

2.26 A major operational advantage of studying national interest on the basis of empirically evident information on national involvements, rather than on a set of arbitrarily defined national goals, is that most nations tend to operate in the international system with a set of roughly qualitatively similar activities. Thus, all nations engage in international trade, exchange diplomatic representations, conclude treaties, participate in international tourism, etc. Moreover, the more powerful countries that concern this study have a number of additional types of international involvement in common. These include economic and military assistance, overseas private investment, the extension of military protection to weaker states, sale of armaments, and large cultural exchange programs. ^{20/}

^{20/} Kenneth N. Waltz has commented on an "imitative" process that seems to take place among the major countries: "Competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors, with those who are unable to keep up simply falling by the wayside....Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity....The effects of competition are not confined narrowly to the military realm. Something that might be called socialization to the international system also occurs." Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. Waltz, editors, Conflict in World Politics, Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971, pp. 472-73.

2.27 Not only are most of the above phenomena measurable, but, more important, their international scope allows the analyst to begin comparing nations on the basis of a consistent and explicit series of criteria of international interests. The potential application of this kind of comparative data is varied.

2.28 From the perspective of the study of comparative foreign policies, data of this type should allow the researcher to investigate a variety of propositions or generate new hypotheses about the national "styles" in which the great powers apportion their interest stakes outside their national boundaries. For instance, the analyst may wish to focus on the particular mix of international stakes that might typify different countries. In this manner, he may be able to shed light on national differences in the degree of cohesiveness among political, military, and economic tools of foreign policy. Patrick J. McGowan's study on Soviet interaction with the African nations in the early 1960s, for instance, found a close correlation between Soviet economic and military assistance disbursements and concluded that "economic and military foreign aid from communist states to African states is a coordinated, politically motivated instrument of foreign policy." ^{21/} A legitimate research question is whether the coherence between Soviet (African) aid programs is unique or if, in fact, other major aid disbursers display similar patterns. Moreover, it may be questioned whether the integration of Soviet aid policy is consistent throughout the

^{21/} Patrick J. McGowan, "Africa and Non-Alignment: A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1968, p. 282.

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underdeveloped world or if perhaps McGowan's findings for the early 1960s have been outdated by more recent developments in Soviet involvement "style." Furthermore, a highly relevant and practical issue in this regard is the extent to which expanding Soviet worldwide commercial activities tend to be accompanied by political inroads. Until recent years, the consensus was that Soviet trade patterns were primarily politically motivated and that Moscow used the extension of favorable trade arrangements mainly to establish political beachheads, which were further expanded by the provision of extremely low-interest, long-term credit terms. Today, on the other hand, it is repeatedly asserted that the Soviet Union is becoming increasingly "commercialized", and perceives its international trade position more and more on its individual merits, i.e., to gain foreign currency reserves, to acquire Western technology, or to simply import commodities that are produced more cheaply elsewhere.

2.29 Additional comparative foreign policy questions that are suggested include, for instance, the issue of Japan's alleged separation of trade from politics. It is envisaged that the aggregate empirical data used in the study will help clarify and define conceivable modifications in this policy since the "Nixon shock" of 1970 and, even more so, following the Arab petroleum embargo of 1973-1974.

2.30 On a wider level, international developments over the last 10 years or so emphasize the appropriateness of taking a systematic inventory of what appears to be a qualitative rearrangement of the largely bipolar structure of international involvements that characterized the first two decades after World War II. The distinction between "Western" and

"Communist Bloc" interests has lost a great deal of relevance today. Instead, numerous thoughtful observers have commented on the acute sense of nationalism that seems to dominate contemporary interstate relations. "Allied" diplomacy has been replaced by unilateral French, West German, or Japanese foreign policy initiatives, which, in conjunction with the shift in the relative distribution of international power, are having a significant effect on the integrity of areas of the world that were hitherto viewed as the "privileged preserves" of a single dominant power.

2.31 Just a cursory examination of international affairs during the last decade provides ready examples of the diffusion of traditional areas of single-power or bloc authority and influence. Thus, recent years have witnessed huge West German private investments in Brazil, French arms sales to Peru, Japanese economic assistance personnel in the former French colony of Mauritania, U.S. arms sales to Kuwait, and Soviet military advisers in Iraq. Indeed, it is conceivable that a systematic analysis of the extent and rate of Japan's and Western Europe's widening circles of nonmilitary involvements will seriously question the validity of George W. Ball's assertion of less than 3 years ago that "Western Europe... plays only a marginal role outside Europe and Africa with a residual interest in the Middle East and nostalgic tags of empire in the Far East and Pacific." ^{22/}

^{22/} George W. Ball, "The Superpowers in Asia," Adelphi Papers, London, No. 91, November 1972, p. 1.

2.32 Time-extended analysis of discrete involvement data may provide an extremely useful tool for identifying possible geographic and functional trends in the structure of multiplying, international, great power interests. Alleged U.S. "disengagement" may be tested against other countries' activities in an effort to clarify perhaps the "power vacuum" theory of international politics.

2.33 A systematic analysis of comparative great power interests, explicitly based on discernible indicators of manifest involvement, ought to contribute significantly to operational policy requirements. Given the earlier proposition that most ongoing foreign policy activities are both determined and constrained by the prevailing framework of a nation's foreign involvements, an explicit description of the international hierarchy from the individual egocentric perspectives of the great powers ought to identify the current policy priorities of the great powers. This should help define those countries and areas in the world where local upheavals, regime changes, or military conflicts are most likely to stimulate great power concern and possible political or military initiatives. Conversely, the availability of comprehensive empirical data should provide the critic of current national policy with the factual tools needed to argue more effectively the alleged misallocation of national interests and policy planning resources.

2.34 A systematic analysis of the structure of relative cross-national rankings ought to sharpen the policymaker's perception of the concerns of other nations; it should serve to improve his understanding of the limitations, opportunities, and risks that are imposed on or are available to him as the natural result of other great powers' interests abroad. In the end, a national strategy might be fashioned more intelligently.

III. SOVIET POLICY AND INTERESTS

3.1 This section contains a cursory overview of the principal international forces that, over the years, have tended to influence the scope and character of Soviet initiatives and involvements outside the immediate Eurasian periphery. In particular, this section suggests that the combination of such diverse conditions as multipolarity, the creation of a Soviet "blue water" navy, and the U.S.-Soviet detente have created the prospect of an increasingly far-flung network of Soviet overseas interests in areas that had been the exclusive domain of the West.

QUESTION OF SOVIET POLICY MOTIVATIONS

3.2 As observed in Section II, Western analysts have tended to view the spectrum of Soviet external activities as a highly integrated, goal-directed phenomenon. Moreover, it is generally assumed that such varied commitments as military aid, cultural exchanges, or commodity trade tend to be primarily politically motivated and designed, if not to extend Soviet influence, at least to undermine U.S., Western, and more recently, Chinese interests in different parts of the world. The explanation by Wynfred Joshua and Stephen Gilbert of the Soviet motivation in supplying arms to the African nations is widely believed to be equally relevant for other forms of Soviet involvement in other regions of the world:

A crucial element in Soviet arms diplomacy in Africa continues to be the objective of eliminating Western and especially American influence....But the existence of a U.S. arms aid program was not a necessary condition for the Soviet Union to act....As a rule, Soviet military aid policies were formulated with broader goals in mind than offsetting a nearby U.S. arms aid presence. They were designed to erode in general the Western position in Africa. 1/

RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS

3.3 In recent years, Western analysts have become aware that other, more instrumental reasons may be assuming an increasingly important role in Soviet engagements abroad. Trade for economic rather than political gain and military assistance to Third World countries to enhance the Soviet military posture rather than to promote singularly political goals appear to have assumed a growing significance in the allocation of Soviet resources abroad. Such a development would be quite consistent with the changed position of the Soviet Union, particularly during the most recent decade.

3.4 Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet external behavior and concerns tended to reflect its self-perceived insecurity as a land-locked power, surrounded by a ring of U.S.-backed adversaries. As a result the Soviet interest was concentrated primarily on improving the security of its immediate borders by breaching the Western cordon and creating, preferably, a series of buffer states that would

1/ Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert, Arms for the Third World--Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, p. 50.

separate Soviet territory from the Western alliance systems. Hence, the earliest Soviet military and economic aid deliveries were focused on the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Afghanistan, Finland, and the Eastern European nations. Active involvement in most other nations (e.g., Yemen and Sudan) tended to be opportunistic rather than in deliberate furtherance of well-designed policy objectives.

3.5 Incipient involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia became increasingly prominent in Soviet policy by the mid-1960s. Soviet hopes that the People's Republic of China would help shield Russian territory from U.S. power in the Pacific evaporated with the Sino-Soviet split, which replaced military and political cooperation with deep-seated animosity. The simultaneously developing political and military crisis between India and China provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to realize its interest in creating a new anti-China buffer state by forging a close military and political relationship with New Delhi.

3.6 The debacle in Cuba in 1962 evidently impressed the Soviet Union with its inability to project significant increments of military power beyond the Eurasian rimlands to support its interests. As a recent unclassified report by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations stated:

...in 1962 a U.S. naval blockade (and the threat of overwhelming nuclear retaliation) forced the Soviets to withdraw strategic weapons from Cuba. In these eyeball-to-eyeball situations the Soviets

had no options for countering Western political-military activities at sea except the pouring forth of propaganda. ^{2/}

3.7 The rediscovery by the Soviet Union of the importance of transoceanic mobility was translated into important improvements in long-distance airlift and maritime capabilities, which, in turn, had a significant impact on Soviet policy objectives beyond the immediate reaches of the Eurasian continent. The possession of global naval and air mobility permitted the Soviet Union to create and support new military and political investments in local areas that had previously been too distant and too vulnerable to Western, particularly U.S., military and political influence. In addition, the logistically unfavorable geography of the Soviet homeland to global naval operations compelled the Soviet Union to search for overseas forward basing arrangements, thereby providing a further incentive for extending the Soviet presence abroad.

3.8 The Soviet surface naval buildup was paralleled by a number of important trends in the superpower relationship, which, in the aggregate, tended to reinforce Soviet opportunities for expanding and consolidating its overseas involvements. Strict bipolarity and cohesive alliance structures were giving way to multipolarity, alliance disintegration, and detente. Both by design and by default, Western containment of the Soviet Union was replaced by U.S.-Soviet detente, Western German "Ostpolitik," and Japanese

^{2/} Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 6.

"normalization" of relations. These developments, plus confidence in the power of its strategic nuclear forces, substantially reduced Soviet paranoia about Western "encirclement" and implied that relatively more resources could be devoted to strengthening the Soviet position in other parts of the world.

3.9 A third phenomenon, after global mobility and detente, that has tended to stimulate Soviet worldwide engagements is what many experts hold to be the increasing "rationalization" of the Soviet Union's external economic relations. The need for foreign currency, Western technology, and guaranteed raw resources, according to knowledgeable observers of the Soviet economy, has forced the Soviet leadership to devalue the political character of its trade relationships in favor of more pragmatic economic considerations. According to Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier:

The trend toward economic rationality in the USSR has not been confined to domestic issues alone. It is also manifest in the search for more advantageous and efficient procedures in foreign economic relations, specifically aid and trade with the third world. In this search for ways to secure tangible gains, Soviet relations with the developing countries are entering a new phase, in which economic considerations of profit are challenging the hitherto dominant political motivations. ^{3/}

3.10 The establishment of joint trading companies or joint shipping lines in Ethiopia and Singapore, for example, and

^{3/} Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations With the Third World," World Politics, Vol. 22:3, April 1970, p. 415.

the use of cheaper Indian labor to import shoes manufactured in a plant constructed with Soviet rubles are two illustrations of profit-motivated activities that hitherto had been denounced as capitalist exploitation.

3.11 Soviet presence beyond the immediately contiguous countries, while at one time an opportunistic activity, has become a "routine" aspect of the international system. As it gains experience and confidence in its role as a truly global military and economic power, the Soviet Union is likely to stake out further areas of lasting involvement across a broad spectrum of activities. It is unclear what effects the widening network of Soviet interests will have on international security in general and on U.S. overseas interests in particular. On the one hand, as the Soviet Union consolidates its involvements in various areas of the world, it may develop a vested interest in local stability and, consequently, will act as a "responsible" global power. Alternatively, expanding Soviet activities may result in repetitive competitions and confrontations with established U.S. or other Western interests. Either way, it is to the advantage of the U.S. policy planner to clearly understand the apparent trends in Soviet regional policy priorities. Responsive and effective policy is predicated on a thoughtful interpretation of the nature of the Soviet goals and interest as these can be extracted from the observed record of Soviet foreign involvement.

IV. CLASSIFICATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET INTERESTS ABROAD

4.1 This section discusses the selection of the indicators used to conceptualize and operationalize the various manifestations of the Soviet interest in foreign countries. Variables were collected to account for three broad categories of manifest interest: the Soviet political stake, military stake, and economic interest throughout the world. In addition to the collection of primary variables, a number of secondary, or derived, indicators were computed to manage the idea of the proportional weight of Soviet involvement. This section concludes with a detailed enumeration of the data collection, sources, security classification (when applicable), and years available.

SOURCE DATA BASE

4.2 The present selection of discrete manifestations of the Soviet interest abroad was guided principally by the experience gained in an earlier study entitled Identification and Measurement of U.S. Interests Abroad. ^{1/} As the predecessor to the current research effort, this study demonstrated the

^{1/} Jan S. Breemer and Peter H. Fenn, Identification and Measurement of U.S. Interests Abroad, Falls Church, Va., Westinghouse Electric Corp., Contract No. MDA-903-74-C-0223, 1974.

usefulness of quantitative data and research techniques to a systematic exploration of the character and extent of U.S. interests worldwide. In particular, the research involved the collection of more than 10 years of data values across 30 indicators believed to be a representative cross-section of U.S. private and public, commercial, political, military, and sociocultural interests in over 100 countries.

4.3 The usefulness of the data collected in the initial U.S.-oriented study plus the requirement for reliable comparative analysis indicated that a maximum effort should be made to assure the consistency of the indicators across all six major powers studied, including the Soviet Union. This decision was made with a reasonable understanding of the uncertainties likely to be encountered in tracking down and acquiring foreign data sources, particularly in the case of the U.S.S.R.

4.4 The study team was also aware that besides the question of data availability, the Soviet Union simply does not engage in the public and private transactions that characterize the worldwide involvements of the U.S. and other Western powers. An obvious case in point is the absence of direct private investment in Soviet involvement behavior. Also, the U.S.S.R. does not have an identifiable counterpart to the sociocultural stake, which, as has been advanced, has sprung up in the U.S. foreign policy calculus with the influx of large numbers of immigrants over the years.

4.5 In cases like these, where the Soviet Union simply does not participate in certain international activities, the study team was compelled to exclude the pertinent variables.

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As a result, any comparative policy conclusions must take careful account of such deviations.

MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVIET INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

4.6 Typically, foreign policy analysts discuss and interpret international affairs in terms of their respective political, military, and economic manifestations. Although arbitrary, this compartmentalization was deemed useful in guiding the collection of the various Soviet interest data. Analysis of the data themselves will determine their de facto empirical interrelationships.

4.7 It must be stressed that, strictly speaking, the selection of variables to be presented does not constitute a random sample from a possible universe of Soviet interests. Instead, they were chosen in the belief that they were reasonably representative of the total distribution of the Soviet interest throughout the international system.

SOVIET POLITICAL STAKE

4.8 The notion that a major power has a discrete political stake in foreign countries is more ambiguous than it may appear. As observed earlier, many analysts find it convenient to discuss and evaluate international phenomena in terms of their respective economic, political, or military relevance. At the same time, most observers would find it extremely difficult to identify and discuss a strictly political interest without linking it--implicitly or explicitly--to overriding, or at least related, economic or security concerns.

4.9 The difficulty of separating political from non-political interests lies in the lack of specificity of the term international politics. Most theorists of international relations agree that international politics defines the processes whereby nation-states attempt to influence each other's behavior. The critical concept in the term is, therefore, the ability to influence or control the international environment to the benefit of one's own national society. It is precisely from this definition, however, that the difficulty in distinguishing between political and nonpolitical interests emerges. The relevant environment to be influenced through political action presumably pertains to the constant competitive need to expand and safeguard one's share of international valuables. This signifies that, unless nation-states engage in politics for its own sake, politics is a necessary by-product of the existence of nonpolitical (economic or security) interests. ^{2/} Therefore, a case could be made that, unlike international economic transactions, for example, the activity called "international politics" cannot exist independently.

4.10 Great powers frequently do act on behalf of interests that are essentially political in nature and that have no discernible relationship to other interests, which could be labeled "true" interests. Prestige or credibility are the

^{2/} Professor Holsti thus logically observed: "...the greater the involvement, dependence, or interdependence, the greater the necessity to wield influence over other nations." (Emphasis added.) K. J. Holsti, International Politics--A Framework for Analysis, 2d. ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, p. 157.

terms generally used to justify or explain policy moves that have no readily apparent relationship to other, identifiable interests.

4.11 The de facto relevance of discrete political stakes has been summarized cogently by Charles Wolf, Jr.:

Clearly, individual countries can acquire a symbolic political value which exceeds their actual economic or military importance. There is, in fact, probably no better indicator of the symbolic political importance that countries acquire than the extent of a prior United States commitment, whether formal or tacit, to assure the country's viability and independence from communist control. United States commitments may be signified by formal guarantee...[or] more informally by large military aid programs or by substantial amounts of non-military aid....In such cases, a country's importance...will exceed that which can be measured simply by looking at the economic and military components of value. ^{3/}

4.12 Observation of actual nation-state behavior confirms the desirability of taking explicit account of the major powers' international political assets. Analysis, in turn, ought to clarify the extent to which these are limited to nonpolitical interests.

4.13 The Soviet Union, like most important actors in the international system, engages in a variety of activities commonly regarded as political in nature or intent. These

^{3/} Charles Wolf, Jr., United States Policy and the Third World--Problems and Analysis, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1967, p. 19.

include the conclusion of formal treaties, the exchange of diplomatic representatives, the provision of economic assistance, and the funding of cultural exchange programs.

TREATIES IN FORCE

4.14 The conclusion of bilateral or multilateral treaties has been the traditional political means among sovereign nation-states to institutionalize international relationships. Frequently, treaties merely serve to codify already existing informal interaction patterns that have reached such importance that mutual obligations and expectations need to be explicitly delineated. The raison d'être for formal treaties is, therefore, the mutually beneficial protection of the signatories' interests. In other words, a treaty systematizes an informal mutual influence (political) relationship that is the necessary result of expanding interaction among nation-states.

4.15 Originally a "means", a treaty relationship (a military alliance in particular) may become an "end" in itself. Circumstances may change drastically, but policy momentum, bureaucratic interests, or simply habit may make the preservation of a formal commitment itself a policy objective. As a result, it may, at times, be difficult to determine whether the political importance of a treaty relationship should be sought in some broader value than that which presumably gave rise to the treaty in the first place or in the existence of the treaty itself. In other words, is a treaty in force merely a political indicator of some other, nonpolitical interest, or is it to be viewed as a political stake itself?

OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET TREATY RELATIONSHIPS

4.16 Operationalization of Soviet international treaty arrangements was accomplished by calculating the cumulative, total number of bilateral and multilateral treaties signed by the Soviet Union since 1946 and in force in the particular year studied. Admittedly, the process of simply counting the number of treaties in existence fails to take account of very real substantive differences that exist between, for example, a health protocol and a major economic pact. However, the very density of the Soviet treaty network provided one adequate reflection of the relative importance of the formal political aspect of the Soviet interest in a particular country.

DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE

4.17 The exchange of diplomatic representatives constitutes a second political means by which nation-states attempt to influence each other's policies and actions and thereby to secure and advance their interests vis-a-vis the respective host countries. The functions and size of a country's diplomatic representation will vary, depending on the dominant character and the magnitude of its interests in a particular host country. Thus, the protection of nationals residing or traveling abroad may be the embassy's principal task in some countries, while among the developing foreign aid recipients, a symbolic presence may be the representation's critical role. Obtaining information, providing advice to national decision-makers at home, or simply maintaining a communication channel between national capitals is likely to be the primary task of diplomatic representatives assigned to "unfriendly" nations.

4.18 In general, the larger and the more diversified a country's interests abroad, the larger its diplomatic staff will be. Marshall R. Singer has noted that the size of the host country will further inflate the number of diplomatic representatives abroad: "...the size (both physical and in terms of population) of the country, and the political saliency of that country at a given time would be major factors in determining the number of diplomats sent [by the major powers]." ^{4/} Singer's observation suggests that measures of the size of diplomatic representations may need to be adjusted against the size of the host countries, so that a more accurate estimate of a country's "political saliency" alone may be derived.

4.19 Like formal treaties, diplomatic representations exist principally to further prior interests; nation-states simply do not establish embassies in countries with whom they have little or no interaction. Unlike treaties, however, the presence of diplomats overseas represents a clear, distinct stake to the sending country. As with all nationals traveling abroad, a country has the clear obligation to protect its foreign representatives from injury. This obligation is magnified by the very function of diplomats as de facto extensions of their home countries. It is also for that reason that diplomatic personnel tend to be more exposed to risks than are private citizens. A deliberate failure by a host country to assure the safety of foreign diplomats is,

^{4/} Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships, New York, The Free Press, 1972, pp. 335-36.

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in effect, a hostile act to the sending country involved and, as such, may precipitate a diplomatic and, possibly, a military crisis.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION

4.20 The Soviet political stake, by token of its diplomatic representation, has been operationalized by summing up the total number of personnel under the jurisdiction of the Soviet ambassador in each country. Only Soviet personnel have been included, i.e., the sizable numbers of local clerical personnel that are frequently employed by foreign embassies have not been considered in the analysis.

ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

4.21 The provision of foreign economic and technical assistance is widely recognized as predominantly a politically motivated activity. Promotion of foreign trade probably occupies a close second place, whereas purely humanitarian reasons tend to be the exception rather than the rule.

4.22 Although the political payoff to a donor country of economic aid is less than clear, most major suppliers are hesitant to eliminate or substantially reduce their programs for fear of uncertain repercussions or that such action might put their competitors at an advantage. Thus, even where a donor country does not reap any evident political or economic rewards, the provision of assistance itself tends to assume, more often than not, a uniquely political importance. Moreover, it should be noted that the political impact of economic aid extends beyond the mere infusion of dollars,

francs, or rubles or the natural desire on the part of the donor country to see its aid program succeed. Marshall R. Singer has summed up some of the concomitants of foreign aid that reinforce its political essence:

When economic aid is extended to a country, there is likely to be an influx of foreign technicians to administer the aid and to offer development assistance. The more of these foreign nationals there are in a country, and the longer they are there, presumably the more they will be able to inculcate their value system in the host country. ...The more sophisticated American government adviser and his Russian, British, and French equivalents are only too aware that it is not just development they are trying to encourage, but development along the lines proven successful in their own countries. ^{5/}

4.23 Economic assistance, therefore, must be considered a discrete political stake for at least two reasons. First, a donor country provides aid to certain countries because it believes it to be an important means for influencing the recipient governments on behalf of its (the donor's) local stakes. Secondly, recipient countries tend to become identified with their respective donors as the result of long-term aid programs; recipients expect to receive aid, while the donor tends to develop a prestige stake in the success of its aid program.

4.24 Since 1954, the Soviet Union is estimated to have provided over \$8 billion in economic aid commitments to the

^{5/} Ibid., p. 257.

noncommunist developing countries. Inclusion of assistance to communist countries more than doubles this figure. ^{6/}

4.25 The political nature of Soviet aid programs is reflected by the fact that they are almost entirely bilateral, the single exception being aid to the U.N. Development Program. Soviet aid is strongly project-oriented and is mainly concentrated on industry, energy, and transport. The best known projects in heavy industry and power are the Bhilai and Bakaro steel plants in India and the Aswan High Dam in Egypt.

4.26 The bulk of Soviet assistance to noncommunist developing countries is extended in the form of loans, generally at 2.5% interest with a repayment period of 12 years. However, the interest rate, as well as the repayment period, may vary significantly according to the recipient or the project. Afghanistan, for instance, has been extended loans at 2% interest with repayment periods of 20 and 30 years.

4.27 Soviet officials have stressed that the absence of vested economic interests in the developing nations is evidence that Soviet aid is not motivated by the Western pursuit of economic or political gain. However, as Elizabeth Valkenier related in an article published in 1970, proposals have circulated in Soviet economic circles for some years to bring about a closer integration between Soviet aid and trade advantage. According to these proposals, aid giving is to be viewed primarily as an alternative to domestic investment.

^{6/} Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Flow of Resources to Developing Countries, Paris, 1973, pp. 408, 410.

Highly placed Soviet aid officials are considered to be generally hostile to this ideological innovation, since, obviously, the idea of profit at the expense of the developing countries compromises a cardinal principal in the Soviet aid program. ^{7/}

4.28 Soviet aid is characterized by a substantial pipeline, i.e., in general, aid commitments tend to be implemented slowly, in part because the Soviet Union tends to be reluctant to finance local costs of projects that are often beyond the means of the recipient. In addition, political considerations may, at times, motivate the Soviet Union to deliberately slow down or halt disbursements, thereby forcing the recipient to choose between a partially finished economic asset and the adoption of a more pro-Soviet stance in its policy.

4.29 The length of the Soviet aid pipeline is indicated by the fact that of over \$8 billion committed since 1954 to the noncommunist developing countries, approximately half of this amount is estimated to have been actually disbursed. ^{8/} The formal announcement and signature of a large Soviet aid commitment by no means signifies its automatic implementation.

^{7/} Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World," World Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3, April 1970.

^{8/} Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, op. cit., p. 409.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

4.30 For the reasons outlined above, it was decided to use annual Soviet aid disbursements by country of destination to determine the role of Soviet economic aid as one aspect of its political stake abroad. A second measure of the impact of Soviet economic aid that has been used in the study is the number of Soviet technical (nonmilitary) advisers assigned to various countries. Inclusion of this second indicator of Soviet economic aid was felt justified on the grounds that the physical presence of foreign experts, either to administer aid programs or to provide training and advice, tends to have an impact beyond the mere transfer of resources.

CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

4.31 Government-sponsored cultural and educational exchange programs are viewed as a relatively inexpensive but important means of political communication. Their political motivation is evident in the fact that most major countries' exchange programs are funded and administered by the foreign ministries.

4.32 Foreign cultural and educational programs encompass a variety of activities. They include sending performing artists; exchanging nuclear scientists, educational personnel, and trade union delegations; establishing libraries; and exchanging university students.

4.33 Some foreign cultural activities reflect peculiarly national pastimes. Thus, the Soviet Union exports ballet troupes, the U.S. Jazz musicians, China ping pong teams, and Japan flower arrangers.

4.34 While all of the above activities presumably contribute to the international image of the sponsoring countries, there is little question that educational programs are by far the most important component in most nations' cultural efforts. Many observers agree with Marshall R. Singer's statement that "it seems quite clear that the vast majority of students who study abroad come away more positively inclined toward the country than they were before they went." ^{9/} Theodore Caplow and Kurt Finsterbusch went even further in their observation on "the massive transfusion of the host country's ideas and values into the sending country when the students return home." ^{10/}

4.35 While all six of the major countries studied engage in foreign educational efforts, the size of their respective programs vary as does, apparently, the relative priority placed on them. Japan, for instance, has a relatively small educational training program, in part because of language difficulties. To a lesser extent, the Soviet Union is faced with a similar problem when it attempts to attract students from the former colonies who frequently speak French or English and are therefore inclined to pursue their studies in France or Britain.

4.36 In general, the geographic distribution of the major powers' cultural proselytizing efforts reflects either former colonial links or, in the case of the U.S. and the

^{9/} Marshall R. Singer, op. cit., p. 151

^{10/} Theodore Caplow and Kurt Finsterbusch, "France and Other Countries: A Study of International Interaction," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 1968, p. 4.

Soviet Union, a product of their post-World War II ideological competition. French and British educational programs are clearly concentrated in Africa, U.S. primarily in Latin America, Japanese in East Asia, Soviet in the Middle East and North Africa, while West Germany has tended to diversify its efforts without an evident geographic preference.

4.37 Soviet leaders have made clear their expectation of significant political payoffs from their country's foreign educational programs. Addressing the first graduating class of the Patrice Lumumbo Friendship University in 1965, Premier Kosygin declared:

We are confident that the University graduates as well as the two thousand foreign specialists graduating this year from other Soviet educational establishments will show themselves and their countries to be not only excellent engineers, doctors, teachers, economists, but also front-rankers in the struggle for the national revival of their countries, for the social progress of their peoples....We would like the University graduates to remain our friends, to become the bearers of an inviolable friendship between their peoples and the peoples of the first country of socialism. ^{11/}

4.38 Cultural, technical, and educational exchange programs are valued as a singularly politically motivated activity. It is reasonable to assume that the geographic locus of the Soviet program is one pertinent indicator of the importance of the political or other stake that Moscow perceives in the target country or region.

^{11/} U.S. Department of State, Research Memorandum, RSB-10, Washington, D.C., 1967, pp. 34-35.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

4.39 The total number and nationality of academic students and technical trainees residing in the Soviet Union in a given year was taken as a valid specification of the geographic scope of Soviet educational exchange policy. Unfortunately, data restrictions prevented the study team from acquiring relevant information on the developed (both communist and noncommunist) countries in the world. Complete annual time series were aggregated, however, for all the developing nations.

SOVIET MILITARY STAKE

4.40 The Soviet Union, like all major powers, displays its military or security interests in foreign areas in a number of ways, including the conclusion of mutual defense alliances, the deployment of military forces, and the provision of military assistance. The notion of a distinct military stake shares some of the same conceptual difficulties as the idea of a discrete political stake. The military component of a great power's international activities is a means to secure those international assets a country deems valuable, whether they are security or economic gain. Strictly speaking, therefore, overseas military involvement has no role in and of itself. ^{12/}

^{12/} An exception would be a "militaristic" nation that engages in military expansion and display for their own sake.

4.41 At the same time, it has been widely recognized that such acts as the overseas stationing of military forces or the extension of a security guarantee tend to be transformed from a means to an object of foreign policy. Military involvement frequently becomes an independent national stake abroad. Ralph N. Clough spoke of this process when he defined "created interests" as "those that the United States (or, presumably, any other country) itself creates in a given country by taking actions (especially by making defense commitments or by actually deploying its armed forces) that create an expectation that the United States would use armed force there in order to protect other types of interests." "Once created," the author added, "such interests are hard to extinguish. Furthermore, they tend to breed other interests." ^{13/}

MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS

4.42 The presence of military forces on foreign soil represents more than a tangible manifestation of the deploying power's interest in the security of the host country on at least two counts. First, it circumscribes a specific, defineable national stake itself. Secondly, many observers believe that the overseas deployment of national military forces tends to yield certain benefits, which, although difficult to pinpoint, are nevertheless real.

4.43 More so than private nationals or even members of the diplomatic corps, military personnel represent a de facto

^{13/} Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 30.

extension of the national integrity of the deploying power. The "trip wire" idea vividly symbolizes the expectation that an attack against foreign military forces will be treated as an attack on the territory of the deploying power.

4.44 Foreign military presence, overseas basing, staging areas, etc., initially conceived in support of a specific national objective, tend to frequently assume a rationale of their own once established. Roles and missions may change, but the facilities tend to remain and to become important foreign policy issues in their own right. Although overseas defense positions may outlive their original purpose, their retention is frequently urged on the basis of the uncertain, but the most likely damaging, effect their elimination is feared to have on other interests. Some opponents of a U.S. troop reduction in Europe have warned, for instance, of a resurgent military West Germany or have implied certain economic benefits that the U.S. has gained from its security guarantee. In a broad sense, therefore, many observers share the largely intuitive belief that a positive relationship somehow exists between the overseas projection of military strength and national advantage.

4.45 Like the U.S., the Soviet Union has stationed the bulk of its extraterritorial military forces in Europe. In addition, large numbers are concentrated in the Mongolian People's Republic, while smaller complements, ranging from a handful to over 1,000 troops, are stationed in a number of the developing countries in support of military training programs or, in a few cases, to staff base facilities.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS

4.46 The total number of Soviet military personnel by country of deployment has been taken as the appropriate measure of the relative importance of the Soviet military presence in different countries. This has been done without regard to the varying functions (e.g., training versus combat) that different deployments may perform.

MILITARY TREATIES

4.47 Robert E. Osgood has defined a military alliance as "a formal agreement binding states to cooperate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually entailing an obligation on the part of one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider...the use of force, in specified circumstances." ^{14/}

4.48 In theory, the signatories to a treaty of alliance carry equal political weight and are equally responsible for each other's security. In practice, however, most contemporary military alliances embody a de facto, one-sided security guarantee on the part of the strongest to the weaker members of the alliance.

4.49 The extension of a formal security commitment is generally considered the most explicit demonstration of a great power's interest in the well-being and integrity of the

^{14/} Robert E. Osgood, "The Nature of Alliances," Johns Hopkins University, School for Advanced International Studies, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Future Role of Military Alliances, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. 1-3.

protected state or states. The guaranteeing power effectively announces that the security and territorial integrity of its allies are virtually integral to its own and that, therefore, it has a strong incentive to treat a threat against them as if it were directed against the great power itself.

4.50 Formal military alliances are only one type of military treaty that can bind a country to the protection of another. Because of the generally vague phraseology that is used in most treaties of alliance, additional military treaties are usually concluded to further specify, clarify, or expand on the original language. Typically, additional agreements pertain to base or overflight rights, status of forces, sharing of defense technology, etc. In fact, the more specific language of supplemental agreements may at times imply a greater commitment than was intended in the original treaty of alliance.

4.51 Because of the expressed willingness to use military means on behalf of another nation (and, by implication, to be exposed to military hostilities on behalf of the other nation) a military alliance and its corollary agreements are probably the most important formal international agreements made. Moreover, a military alliance is "exclusive," i.e., unlike commercial or cultural agreements, the recipient of a formal security guarantee cannot engage in an alliance with the party against whom the first obligation is directed. The guarantor nation has an exclusive security stake in the protected country.

4.52 Until recently, the Soviet Union had limited its formal military alliance structure exclusively to communist nations, primarily in Eastern Europe. In the 1970s, however, so-called

"Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation" were concluded with a number of noncommunist developing nations, including Egypt, India, Iraq, and Somalia, with whom the Soviet Union had developed strong security ties through the provision of large-scale military assistance. All four treaties call for joint consultation in the event of outside military aggression against one of the signatories.

4.53 Soviet willingness to assume a greater responsibility for local or regional security in noncommunist areas of the world is similarly evident in Moscow's repeated calls for the creation of a collective (presumably primarily anti-Chinese) East Asian security arrangement.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET MILITARY TREATY ARRANGEMENTS

4.54 Operationalization of the Soviet international military treaty framework proceeded along the same lines used for non-military bilateral and multilateral treaties. Included in the treaty count were mutual defense pacts, status of forces agreements, and formal military assistance arrangements.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

4.55 Military alliances usually engender security assistance from the primary protecting power to the other, protected, member nations. The existence of an alliance is not a necessary prerequisite, however, for the provision of equipment, training or logistical support. A donor or recipient nation may prefer to avoid the dramatic international impact that the conclusion of a military alliance tends to have or the restriction of political flexibility that may result.

Moreover, once entered into, a formal military pact frequently becomes a long-term, self-sustaining interest that, despite changing conditions, tends to generate a strong presumption against its abrogation.

4.56 In theory at least, arms aid alone is a more expedient mechanism. It involves a more restricted contract, and it allows the supplier to insulate himself from conflicts where an alliance relationship might not. Security assistance per se may serve purposes other than enhancing the recipient's and, theoretically by extension, the donor nation's security. For instance, based on the belief that arms aid procures political influence, a great power may initiate an assistance program simply to preempt its provision by alternative, rival sources.

4.57 The extent to which the different great powers perceive their security assistance programs as political rather than uniquely security-oriented activities should be demonstrated by the degree of empirical linkage that exists between security assistance and other indicators of political stakes abroad. For data organization, it has been assumed that the provision of military aid is one aspect of a great power's military stake abroad.

4.58 Until a few years ago, most analysts tended to regard Soviet security assistance to countries other than those on Russia's immediate periphery as primarily politically motivated. That is to say, whereas the explicit purpose of, for example, U.S. or British overseas military aid has been to strengthen the recipient countries' defenses (and, by inference, that of the donor countries), Soviet military aid

diplomacy was thought to be driven with only a secondary regard for the de facto security needs of countries.

Wynfred Joshua and Stephen Gilbert argued accordingly:

Soviet military aid was designed to promote two basic long range and closely related political objectives. The defensive aim was the impairment of Western, especially American, influence in the states and regions receiving aid....The offensive objective...was the extension of Russian influence in the developing world. The USSR used its military aid instrument to demonstrate its support for the national independence of recipient states, and expected in return to enhance its stature and influence in the Third World. 15/

4.59 In recent years, the military utility of arms aid appears to have taken on an increasingly prominent role in the Soviet Union's selection of clients and types of items to be delivered. Improved Soviet sea and air mobility has generated a requirement for foreign logistical and minor repair facilities (e.g., Berbera in Somalia). Also, in the case of India, the Soviet Union probably perceives a strong Indian defense establishment as a desirable contribution to its own anti-Chinese military posture. As the Soviet Union becomes more confident in its role as a global power and perceives a declining U.S. determination to actively oppose it across the globe, it may be expected that Moscow will attempt to gradually extend the perimeter of its security interests.

15/ Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gilbert, Arms for the Third World--Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, pp. 149-150.

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OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE

4.60 Annual delivered dollar values of military equipment transferred as grant aid or discounts were used to define the concept of Soviet security assistance.

ARMS SALES

4.61 It has been only very recently that the commercial sale of military equipment and services has begun to be treated as a major power activity with an identity of its own. Previously, military assistance and military sales tended to be viewed as a single reflection of the donor nation's interest in the recipient's security.

4.62 It has become increasingly difficult, however, to distinguish between security and commercial motivations in the foreign cash or credit sales of military hardware. Many critics of the contemporary boom in arms sales contend that the supplier countries are primarily concerned with improving their balance of payment or maintaining domestic employment levels.

4.63 The apparently multidimensional character of the commercial arms sales phenomenon is further complicated by the political importance that is attached to it. The sale of weapons to a particular country is frequently justified on the grounds of the political influence that is presumed to accrue. The French Government, for instance, justified its Mirage sale to Libya partly on the grounds that, since nothing prevented the Libyans from acquiring their arms elsewhere, it was preferable to establish French rather than

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Soviet influence. ^{16/} Similarly, U.S. Government spokesmen have repeatedly argued that the provision of U.S. equipment will provide the political leverage to inhibit potential military conflicts. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified in the summer of 1973:

Our ability to influence and constrain (other countries') activities, to preclude their going to hostilities or to temper their tendency to go toward hostilities, is enhanced if they have decided to buy military hardware from the U.S. and if there is a close association between U.S. military leaders and the officers of the countries concerned, as opposed to a condition in which there is a close association between, say, Soviet military officers and the leadership of the country concerned. ^{17/}

4.64 The bulk of Soviet arms sales is provided under long-term, frequently heavily discounted, credit arrangements. The usually soft credit terms of Soviet sales make it difficult to draw a clear-cut distinction between sales and outright gifts. Moreover, most recipients of Soviet arms tend to be the beneficiary of both programs, suggesting that commercial considerations play only a minor role in a Soviet decision to sell arms abroad.

^{16/} See Dorothy Pickles, The Government and Politics of France, Vol. 2, Politics, London, Methuen and Co., 1973, pp. 324-25.

^{17/} U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, FY 1974, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 1295.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF SOVIET ARMS SALES

4.65 The annual delivered dollar values of Soviet arms transferred abroad, both on credit and on a cash basis, have been used to operationalize the flow of Soviet arms sales. Lack of data on Soviet arms transfers to the Warsaw Pact countries prevented their inclusion in the relevant data file.

SOVIET ECONOMIC STAKE

4.66 The notion that countries have identifiable foreign economic interests is probably the least controversial of the three principal "classes" of major power interest (political, military, economic) that have been postulated. To many countries, e.g., Japan and the United Kingdom, expanding foreign exports are crucial to national growth and domestic prosperity. Even to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, who benefit from vast domestic markets, promotion of international trade takes up a large share of the national policymakers' attention and effort.

FOREIGN IMPORTS

4.67 Foreign imports constitute a highly significant component of a nation's international economic stake. Despite the adverse effect of imports on the national balance of payments, nations share an economic stake in the countries from which their respective imports originate for at least two reasons. First, the particular commodities received may fall into that rather obscure category labeled "critical strategic materials." Secondly, it must be assumed that nations (in most cases, their private business communities)

derive their imports at the lowest cost possible. ^{18/}
Consequently, the loss of imports from a particular country can only be regained by imports from an alternative source at a higher price.

4.68 Sheer volume of trade is not the sole criterion for a bilateral trade relationship. Nations, like commercial enterprises, constantly evaluate commercial performance (like their political and military performance) in relation to other countries. National world trade statistics are thus normally expressed in dollars (francs, deutsche marks, etc.) as well as proportional market shares. Relative market shares are an important indicator not only of the extent of a country's commercial penetration and, by implication, its commercial and, possibly, political leverage, but also of the competitiveness of its international trade. Since, with few exceptions, large volumes of trade do not appear to be accompanied by high degrees of commercial penetration, it is important that a great power's international commercial stake be described and analyzed on both levels.

DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT

4.69 Overseas private investment is a third identifiable aspect of a nation's economic stake abroad. Despite contemporary concern with the "extranational" character and power of the large multinational corporations and the questioned ability of both home and host country to maintain effective authority over the corporations' actions, it is generally

^{18/} It is conceivable that, for political reasons, importing nations are willing to pay higher than market price for imported goods from certain countries.

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held that overseas investments constitute an important national asset, whose security may, at times, demand the protection by national power and diplomacy.

4.70 Private investments in a foreign country's economy are perceived to be important on at least two grounds. First, at least part of the income stream associated with an overseas economic activity is returned to the home country and is added to the national balance of payments. Secondly, private investment in certain types of foreign industry (principally extractive) may secure privileged national access to critical foreign resources. A case in point is the "buffer effect" that the oil companies had in helping to immunize the importing countries from the full effect of OPEC's petroleum embargo in early 1974. Thus, despite the Arab boycott, the Anglo-Dutch Shell Company's control over the international distribution process through its tanker fleet helped secure adequate petroleum imports for the Netherlands.

INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF NATIONALS

4.71 Associated with international trade and overseas investments are normally large numbers of private citizens engaged in the daily conduct and advancement of their home country's commercial interests. Overseas business communities constitute only a fraction of the nationals that may be found outside the national boundaries at any one time. Tourists, students, and, particularly in the Western European countries, unskilled foreign laborers (the so-called "guestworkers") add up to an important interest for the governments of the respective home countries. Indeed, as demonstrated during

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the "Mayaguez" incident, few uses of national power carry as great a consensus as the protection of the lives of citizens abroad.

4.72 To recapitulate, the following activities are considered important manifestations of a nation's economic or, perhaps more precisely, commercial stake abroad:

- The monetary value of imports
- The monetary value of exports
- The monetary value of direct private investments
- The number of nationals residing/traveling abroad
- Relative export market shares
- Relative import market shares.

4.73 All but the third of the above listed activities have become increasingly relevant to the Soviet role in the international system. Soviet trade outside the Communist Bloc has grown rapidly, while an increasing number of Russians are having the opportunity to travel outside the Soviet Union, even though destinations remain under strict government control.

DATA RECAPITULATION

4.74 Table 4.1 contains a detailed listing of the primary variables that were selected to operationalize the several aspects of the Soviet interest abroad that have been enumerated in the preceding paragraphs. Table 4.2 lists the secondary, or "derived," indicators that were incorporated

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TABLE 4.1
PRIMARY VARIABLES SELECTED TO OPERATIONALIZE
THE SOVIET INTEREST ABROAD

Variable Name*	Years ** Examined	Data Source
Number of Diplomatic Personnel Abroad (DIPPERS)	1968-1973	CIA, Directorate of Plans: <u>Soviet Checklist</u> (SECRET)
Dollar Value of Soviet Exports (EXPORTS)	1968-1973	International Monetary Fund: <u>Direction of Trade</u> (UNCLASSIFIED)
Dollar Value of Soviet Imports (IMPORTS)	1968-1973	International Monetary Fund: <u>Direction of Trade</u> (UNCLASSIFIED)
Number of Military Forces Abroad (MILPERS)	1968-1973	DIA: <u>Military Intelligence Summary</u> (SECRET)
Number of Soviet Military Treaties in Force (ALLPAC)	1968-1973	World Treaty Index and Keesing's <u>Con-temporary Archives</u> (UNCLASSIFIED)
Number of Nonmilitary Technical Students in the Soviet Union (STUDENTS)	1968-1973	U.S. Intelligence Board: <u>Soviet Aid and Trade</u> (SECRET)
Number of Technical Advisors Abroad (ECOADV)	1968-1973	DIA: <u>Foreign Military Assistance</u> (FOMA) (SECRET)
Number of Soviet Treaties in Force (MILPAC)	1968-1973	World Treaty Index and Keesing's <u>Con-temporary Archives</u> (UNCLASSIFIED)
Value of Arms Sales Abroad (Delivered) (ARMS \$)	1968-1973	DIA: <u>Foreign Military Assistance</u> (FOMA) (SECRET)
Value of Security Assistance Abroad (Delivered) (SECAID)	1968-1973	DIA: <u>Foreign Military Assistance</u> (FOMA) (SECRET)
Value of Economic Assistance (Delivered) (ECOVID)	1968-1973	U.S. Intelligence Board: <u>Soviet Aid and Trade</u> (SECRET)
Number of Soviet Tourists Abroad (TOURIST)	1968-1973	United Nations: <u>Statistical Yearbook</u> and IUOTO (UNCLASSIFIED)

* Additional variables have been collected and machine stored but have not been used in the present analysis.

** Additional data years are available for a number of variables but have not been examined in this study.

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TABLE 4.2

SECONDARY VARIABLES SELECTED TO OPERATIONALIZE
THE SOVIET INTEREST ABROAD

Variable Name	Years Examined	Data Source
Number of Diplomatic Personnel per capita of Host Country Population (DIPPOP)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (SECRET)
Number of Tourists Abroad per capita of Host Country Population (TOURPOP)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (UNCLASSIFIED)
Value of Economic Assistance per capita of Recipient Country Population (AIDPOP)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (SECRET)
Value of Security Assistance per capita of Recipient Country Population (SECPOP)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (SECRET)
Value of Arms Sales per capita of Recipient Country Population (ARMSPOP)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (SECRET)
Number of Foreign Students Sent to U.S.S.R. per capita of Sending Country Population (STUDPOP)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (SECRET)
Number of Technical Advisors per capita of Host Country Population (ADVPOP)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (SECRET)
Number of Military Abroad per capita of Host Country Population (MILPOP)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (SECRET)
Value of Soviet Exports as a Percentage of Importing Country's Worldwide Imports (IMSHARE)	1968-1973	International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (UNCLASSIFIED)
Value of Soviet Imports as a Percentage of Exporting Country's Worldwide Exports (EXSHARE)	1968-1973	International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade (UNCLASSIFIED)
Value of Security Assistance as a Percentage of Recipient Country's Self-Finance Defense Budget (SECBDGT)	1968-1973	World Statistical Data, Defense Management Summary, 1974 (SECRET)

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into the analysis to examine the impact of Soviet involvement in different countries as a function of national "size" attributes, such as population, defense expenditures, and total trade flows.

V. ANALYTIC RESULTS

5.1 This section describes the use of R-factor analysis and orthogonal rotation to examine the dimensional composition of the Soviet worldwide interest profile. One hundred and thirty-four countries were tested across the selected twenty-three primary and secondary indicators of the Soviet state abroad.

ANALYTIC PROCEDURES

5.2 Three principal analytic steps were involved in the data manipulation. First, bivariate correlation coefficients were computed between and among all variables to measure their bivariate strength and direction of relationship. Secondly, annual orthogonally rotated factor matrices were computed to test the dimensional composition of all 3,082 data points (134 countries times 23 variables). Finally, all 134 countries were scored on each of the six individual dimensions of the Soviet interest that were found to explain the totality of Soviet worldwide activity. In addition, composite scores were calculated, so that an aggregate rank ordering of nations could be obtained across all six dimensions. Preceding the interpretation of the results, this section provides a quick overview of the principal considerations involved in the use of factor analysis.

USE OF FACTOR ANALYSIS

5.3 The principal characteristic of factor, or component, analysis is its ability to reduce a host of seemingly unrelated information to a limited number of common factor patterns, which are therefore analytically more manageable. These patterns are frequently called factors, dimensions, or components. In the study at hand, the objective was to investigate to what extent the 23 manifestations of the Soviet stake abroad could be concentrated into a reduced number of distinct dimensions of Soviet involvement, without losing too much of the information contained in the original raw data.

5.4 Statistically, factor analysis groups together those variables that display a high degree of intercorrelation, which then permits the researcher to infer the existence of a set of common underlying causes or influences. The resulting variable groupings, or common factors, become new, composite variables.

5.5 The initial output of factor analysis is the unrotated factor matrix, which consists of a series of columns containing variable loadings. Each of the columns defines a factor, and each of the factors is separate (uncorrelated) from the others. The variables that load high on a particular factor (usually $|.50|$) define that factor's character. The number of factors in a factor matrix is the number of substantively meaningful independent patterns of relationships among the variables. For instance, a four-factor solution may be interpreted as evidence of few different kinds of influence or causes underlying the data. This


solution may be used to classify data or to illuminate four empirically different concepts for describing the original information.

5.6 Each unrotated factor can be thought of as an axis projected through a cluster of variable vectors. The smaller the distance between the variable and the imaginary axis, the greater its loading (contribution) on the factor. Similarly, the closer the angle between two variable vectors, the stronger their relationship (product-moment correlation) is; conversely, variables that are unrelated to one another will be at right angles to each other. ^{1/}


5.7 In the unrotated matrix, the first factor axis is projected through the configuration of variable vectors to account for the greatest regularity in the data, i.e., the axis seeks the best possible fit with the maximum number of data points. Each successive axis is then fitted to best define the remaining regularity. As a result, the unrotated matrix usually compromises data distinctness for data comprehensiveness. By rotating the imaginary axes as a fixed structure, the investigator seeks to realign the axes with distinct clusters of variables.

5.8 Figures 5.1a and 5.1b have plotted the rotation of two factor axes (F_1 and F_2) against a set of eight hypothetical variables (depicted as vector points) across an undefined number of cases. The projection of each vector point on the factor axes is the loading of the respective variable.

^{1/} The cosine of the angle between two vectors is equal to the product-moment correlation between the two variables represented by the vectors.



a. Factors F_1 and F_2



b. Factors F_1' and F_2'

FIGURE 5.1

REPRESENTATION OF ORTHOGONAL SIMPLE STRUCTURE ROTATION OF
EIGHT HYPOTHETICAL VARIABLES

(with arrows indicating direction and degree of rotation of factors)

5.9 Figure 5.1a demonstrates how, in the unrotated axis structure, the first factor (F_1) tends to seek out the most general pattern of interrelationships among the variables, with the remaining interdependencies defined by F_2 . Figure 5.1a also clarifies how the aim of data comprehensiveness fails to point out the separateness between the two clusters (A and B) of vector points. Variable loadings of clusters A and B on F_1 (dotted lines) would be roughly similar and hence would prevent the analyst from confirming their de facto distinctness.

5.10 In Figure 5.1b the $F'_1 - F'_2$ axis structure has been rotated clockwise until it has defined clusters involving a minimum number of highly intercorrelated variables. Instead of emphasizing general patterns involving the largest number of interdependent variables, the rotated solution has shifted the focus to patterns involving separate groups of variables, i.e., F'_1 and F'_2 .

5.11 The movement of the factor axes as a rigid structure, with each factor fixed to the origin at a right (orthogonal) angle is called orthogonal rotation. When aligned with distinct clusters of variables, the orthogonal axis structure defines uncorrelated patterns of relationships.

CORRELATION MATRICES

5.12 The initial step toward the terminal factor solution was the computation of a matrix of bivariate correlation coefficients for each of the 6 years (1968-1973) studied. Although the factor analysis and not the correlation matrix is the aim, the latter contains much useful knowledge that

allows the reader to test various hypotheses and theories on the relationship between pairs of variables.

5.13 The value of the correlation coefficient, or "r," is a measure of the strength and direction of association between two variables. The square of the coefficient, or the coefficient of determination, expresses the percent variation in common for the data on the two variables. For instance, if a correlation of 0.90 exists between A and B, knowledge of the value of a case on Variable A would allow the "prediction" of 81 percent ($0.90^2 \times 100$) of the value of the same case on Variable B.

5.14 Table 5.1 defines the variables used in Tables 5.2 through 5.8. The coefficient arrays displayed in Tables 5.2 through 5.8 are of interest since they highlight bivariate associations that may no longer be apparent from the multivariable relationships that are expressed in the final rotated factor matrices. In other words, since it is the property of factor analysis to seek out those clusters of variables that display the greatest amount of intercorrelation, weaker, but possibly still significant, binary relationships between pairs of variables tend to be suppressed. In particular, the terminal factor solution may fail to depict certain trends in the relationships between different aspects of Soviet foreign involvement, which, although weak perhaps in a strict statistical sense, may be highly suggestive of future developments that deserve the attention of the policy planner.

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TABLE 5.1
VARIABLE LEGEND

<u>Code</u>	<u>Variable Definition</u>
STUDENT	Number of foreign students in USSR
ARMS\$	Dollar value of Soviet arms sales (delivered)
MILPAC	Soviet bilateral and multilateral military treaties in force
ALLPAC	Soviet bilateral and multilateral treaties in force
ECO Aid	Dollar value of Soviet economic assistance (delivered)
ECOADV	Number of Soviet economic technicians abroad
MILPERS	Number of Soviet military personnel abroad
DIPPERS	Number of Soviet personnel under jurisdiction of embassy
SECAID	Dollar value of Soviet security assistance (delivered)
TOURIST	Number of Soviet tourists abroad
IMPORTS	Dollar value of Soviet imports
EXPORTS	Dollar value of Soviet exports
MILPOP	Soviet military personnel abroad per host country population
TOURPOP	Number of Soviet tourists abroad per host country population
EXSHARE	Value of Soviet imports per country's total exports
IMSHARE	Value of Soviet exports per country's total imports
AIDPOP	Dollar value of Soviet economic assistance delivered per recipient country population
SECBUDG	Dollar value of Soviet security assistance (delivered) per recipient country self-financed defense expenditures
SECPop	Dollar value of Soviet security assistance (delivered) per recipient country population
ARMSPOP	Dollar value of Soviet arms sales (delivered) per recipient country population
STUDPOP	Number of foreign students in USSR per sending country's population
ADVPOP	Number of Soviet economic technicians abroad per host country population

TABLE 5.2
MATRIX OF PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SELECTED
INDICATORS OF SOVIET EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN 1968

	STUDENT	ARMS\$	MILPAC	ALLPAC	ECOAID	ECOADV	MILPERS	DIPPERS	SECAID	TOURIST	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	MILPOP	DIPPOP	TOURPOP	EXSHARE	IMSHARE	AIDPOP	SECBUG	SECPop	ARMSPOP	STUDPOP	ADVPop
STUDENT	1.00																						
ARMS\$.39	1.00																					
MILPAC	-.12	-.02	1.00																				
ALLPAC	-.15	.01	.69	1.00																			
ECOAID	.19	.04	-.05	.16	1.00																		
ECOADV	.34	.18	-.08	.04	.83	1.00																	
MILPERS	-.07	-.02	.53	.28	-.02	.03	1.00																
DIPPERS	.10	-.02	.02	.44	.41	.35	.05	1.00															
SECAID	.18	.38	-.05	.09	.48	.48	-.02	-.01	1.00														
TOURIST	-.17	-.01	.79	.71	-.04	.07	.43	.15	-.04	1.00													
IMPORTS	-.15	.01	.78	.69	.07	.02	.72	.23	.03	.83	1.00												
EXPORTS	-.16	.03	.76	.69	.03	-.01	.67	.21	-.02	.86	.97	1.00											
MILPOP	-.08	-.02	.42	.27	-.03	.04	.74	.01	-.02	.44	.49	.50	1.00										
DIPPOP	-.01	-.03	.03	.04	-.03	.22	-.01	.10	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.02	.01	1.00									
TOURPOP	-.10	-.02	.29	.31	-.04	-.05	.18	.01	-.02	.47	.24	.29	.75	.05	1.00								
EXSHARE	-.10	.01	.37	.32	-.00	.02	.33	-.01	-.01	.49	.35	.42	.81	.02	.92	1.00							
IMSHARE	-.06	-.01	.11	.14	-.02	.03	.11	-.03	-.02	.26	.04	.10	.74	.02	.95	.90	1.00						
AIDPOP	.32	.15	-.07	.03	.61	.63	-.03	.11	.35	-.06	-.02	-.04	-.03	.01	-.04	-.02	-.03	1.00					
SECBUG	.19	.16	-.06	-.10	.03	.32	-.02	-.03	.63	-.06	-.06	-.06	-.03	.02	-.03	-.03	-.02	.23	1.00				
SECPop	.13	.26	.06	-.09	.07	.29	-.02	-.04	.74	-.05	-.05	-.04	-.03	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.02	.38	.69	1.00			
ARMSPOP	.32	.85	-.04	-.04	.06	.19	-.02	-.03	.50	-.02	-.01	.02	-.03	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.01	.26	.31	.64	1.00		
STUDPOP	.25	.01	-.06	-.17	-.02	.01	-.03	-.07	.01	-.07	-.08	-.08	-.03	.04	-.04	-.05	-.03	.07	.05	.03	.01	1.00	
ADVPop	.41	.15	-.09	-.10	.23	.55	-.04	.02	.46	-.09	-.08	-.09	-.04	.07	-.05	-.05	-.03	.65	.52	.46	.19	.15	1.00

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TABLE 5.3
MATRIX OF PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SELECTED
INDICATORS OF SOVIET EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN 1969

	STUDENT	ARMS\$	MILPAC	ALLPAC	ECOADV	MILPERS	DIPPERS	SECAID	TOURIST	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	MILPOP	DIPPOP	TOURPOP	EXSHARE	INSHARE	AIDPOP	SECBUDG	SECPOP	ARMSPOP	STUDPOP	ADVPOP
STUDENT	1.00																					
ARMS\$.23	1.00																				
MILPAC	-.14	-.03	1.00																			
ALLPAC	-.17	.16	.69	1.00																		
ECOADV	.27	.82	-.06	.15	1.00																	
ECOADV	.34	.48	-.08	.08	.75	1.00																
MILPERS	.08	-.02	.53	.28	-.02	-.03	1.00															
DIPPERS	.10	.50	.00	.44	.49	.30	.04	1.00														
SECAID	.18	.18	-.04	.08	.25	.46	-.01	.07	1.00													
TOURIST	.18	-.00	.80	.70	-.04	-.06	.45	.13	.01	1.00												
IMPORTS	-.16	.12	.76	.70	.10	.06	.68	.26	.09	.84	1.00											
EXPORTS	-.15	.13	.76	.68	.07	.01	.69	.21	.04	.86	.97	1.00										
MILPOP	-.09	-.02	.42	.27	-.03	-.04	.75	-.01	-.02	.44	.47	.51	1.00									
DIPPOP	.01	-.03	-.04	.04	-.02	-.01	-.02	.11	-.01	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.03	1.00								
TOURPOP	-.11	-.02	.33	.33	-.04	-.05	.20	.00	-.01	.48	.27	.32	.75	.01	1.00							
EXSHARE	-.16	.00	.38	.32	.01	-.00	.34	-.02	.04	.50	.35	.42	.80	-.03	.93	1.00						
INSHARE	-.06	-.01	.11	.14	-.02	-.03	.11	-.04	-.01	.23	.03	.09	.73	-.03	.93	.90	1.00					
AIDPOP	.34	.08	-.07	.01	.51	.56	-.03	.11	.15	-.06	-.02	-.04	-.03	.04	-.04	-.00	1.00					
SECBUDG	.31	.05	-.04	-.04	.10	.15	-.02	.01	.35	-.03	-.02	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.02	-.01	.23	1.00				
SECPOP	.36	.18	-.04	.05	.11	.30	-.01	.04	-.82	.00	.03	.05	-.02	-.01	-.00	-.03	.09	.46	1.00			
ARMSPOP	.27	.24	.04	.02	.14	.21	-.03	.05	.40	-.01	.00	.04	-.03	.08	-.02	.00	.14	.15	.57	1.00		
STUDPOP	.29	-.02	-.06	-.17	-.02	-.00	-.03	-.07	-.00	-.07	-.08	-.07	-.03	.04	-.04	-.04	.06	.03	.02	.09	1.00	
ADVPOP	-.36	.04	-.08	-.08	.23	.57	-.07	.02	.17	-.08	-.05	-.07	.04	.09	-.05	-.03	.63	.11	.18	.35	.14	1.00

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TABLE 5.4
MATRIX OF PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SELECTED
INDICATORS OF SOVIET EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN 1970

	STUDENT	ARMS\$	MILPAC	ALLPAC	ECOADV	MILPERS	DIPPERS	SECAID	TOURIST	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	MILPOP	DIPPOP	TOURPOP	EXSHARE	IMSHARE	AIDPOP	SECBUG	SECPOP	ARMSPOP	STUDPOP	ADVPOP
STUDENT	1.00																					
ARMS\$.06	1.00																				
MILPAC	-.17	-.02	1.00																			
ALLPAC	-.18	.14	.71	1.00																		
ECOADV	.33	.36	-.06	.12	1.00																	
ECOADV	.49	.25	-.08	.06	.82	1.00																
MILPERS	-.03	.02	.50	.28	-.02	-.03	1.00															
DIPPERS	.07	.18	.04	.45	.32	.25	.06	1.00														
SECAID	-.02	.92	-.03	.09	.29	.20	.03	.09	1.00													
TOURIST	-.18	-.02	.81	.70	-.05	-.08	.46	.14	-.03	1.00												
IMPORTS	-.16	.17	.75	.71	.06	.01	.66	.27	.13	.85	1.00											
EXPORTS	-.15	.05	.78	.68	.05	.01	.71	.21	.02	.87	.98	1.00										
MILPOP	-.09	-.01	.41	.27	-.03	-.04	.76	.00	-.00	.45	.49	.53	1.00									
DIPPOP	-.01	-.02	-.02	.03	-.03	-.02	-.01	.10	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.02	1.00								
TOURPOP	-.11	-.02	.33	.33	-.04	-.05	.20	.01	-.02	.47	.29	.30	.75	.00	1.00							
EXSHARE	-.06	-.00	.13	.16	-.02	-.02	.13	-.04	.00	.27	.10	.12	.74	-.02	.95	1.00						
IMSHARE	-.07	-.01	.12	.14	-.02	-.03	.12	-.04	-.01	.25	.08	.10	.72	-.02	.93	.98	1.00					
AIDPOP	.42	.21	-.06	.01	.75	.75	-.02	.09	.18	-.06	-.02	.00	-.03	-.01	-.03	-.02	-.02	1.00				
SECBUG	.29	.31	-.04	.05	.10	.38	-.01	.08	.37	-.04	-.02	-.01	-.02	-.00	-.02	-.00	-.01	.11	1.00			
SECPOP	.08	.91	-.04	.09	.32	.27	.02	.09	.98	-.03	.12	.03	-.01	-.01	-.02	.00	-.01	.30	.43	.00		
ARMSPOP	.03	.57	-.04	.01	.16	.14	.01	.03	.43	-.03	.05	.01	-.02	.05	-.02	-.01	-.02	.26	.17	.48	1.00	
STUDPOP	.32	-.02	-.05	-.16	-.02	-.00	-.03	-.07	-.02	-.06	-.07	-.07	-.03	.04	-.04	-.02	-.02	.00	.00	-.01	-.01	1.00
ADVPOP	.17	.07	-.08	-.10	.34	.60	-.04	.01	.06	-.09	-.08	-.06	-.04	.07	-.05	-.03	.59	.21	.14	.15	.11	1.00

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TABLE 5.5
MATRIX OF PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SELECTED
INDICATORS OF SOVIET EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN 1971

	STUDENT	ARMS\$	MILPAC	ALPAC	ECAID	ECAADV	MILPERS	DIPPERS	SECAID	TOURIST	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	MILPOP	DIPPOP	TOURPOP	EXSHARE	IMSHARE	AIDPOP	SECBUG	SECP	ARMSPOP	STUDPOP	ADVPOP
STUDENT	1.00																						
ARMS\$.40	1.00																					
MILPAC	-.13	.07	1.00																				
ALPAC	-.14	.18	.72	1.00																			
ECAID	.51	.74	.01	.13	1.00																		
ECAADV	.59	.52	-.04	.05	.77	1.00																	
MILPERS	-.07	-.01	.49	.26	-.02	-.03	1.00																
DIPPERS	.11	.43	.09	.44	.37	.26	.05	1.00															
SECAID	.37	.55	.05	.09	.51	.29	.02	.08	1.00														
TOURIST	-.05	.01	.35	.32	.00	-.02	.11	-.01	.06	1.00													
IMPORTS	-.09	.16	.79	.71	.08	.01	.66	.27	.12	.48	1.00												
EXPORTS	-.14	.07	.80	.70	.02	-.01	.67	.19	.03	.45	.97	1.00											
MILPOP	-.09	-.03	.41	.27	-.03	-.04	.78	.00	-.01	.08	.48	.51	1.00										
DIPPOP	.01	-.02	-.02	.03	-.03	-.02	-.01	.10	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.02	1.00									
TOURPOP	-.06	.01	.33	.29	-.02	-.03	.07	-.01	.01	.97	.44	.41	.05	-.02	1.00								
EXSHARE	-.06	.00	.22	.22	-.02	-.02	.21	-.04	.02	.15	.18	.22	.76	-.02	.16	1.00							
IMSHARE	-.07	-.02	.11	.13	-.03	-.03	.10	-.05	-.01	.03	.04	.09	.67	-.02	.03	.96	1.00						
AIDPOP	.47	.31	-.07	.11	.51	.59	-.03	.04	.28	-.02	-.05	-.06	-.04	.01	-.03	-.04	.04	1.00					
SECBUG	.43	.25	-.04	.04	.32	.57	-.01	.07	.44	.00	.01	-.01	-.03	-.01	-.01	.01	.01	.33	1.00				
SECP	.49	.56	.01	.07	.47	.43	.01	.06	.83	.04	.08	.03	-.01	-.02	.01	.01	.01	.42	.58	1.00			
ARMSPOP	.18	.40	-.04	-.05	.18	.20	-.02	.02	.20	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.03	-.04	-.01	-.02	-.02	.37	.18	.37	1.00		
STUDPOP	.43	.01	-.11	.20	.01	.07	-.05	-.08	.01	-.05	-.13	-.13	-.06	.21	-.04	-.05	-.05	.36	.06	.08	.10	1.00	
ADVPOP	.49	.17	-.09	.11	.32	.62	-.04	.01	.14	-.03	-.08	-.07	-.04	.04	-.03	-.03	-.03	.79	.45	.37	.28	.41	1.00

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TABLE 5.6
MATRIX OF PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SELECTED
INDICATORS OF SOVIET EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN 1972

	STUDENT	ARMS\$	MILPAC	ALLPAC	ECOAID	ECOADV	MILPERS	DIPPERS	SECAID	TOURIST	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	MILPOP	DIPPOP	TOURPOP	EXSHARE	INSHARE	AIDPOP	SECBUG	SECPop	ARMSPOP	STUDPOP	ADVPOP
STUDENT	1.00																						
ARMS\$.49	1.00																					
MILPAC	-.11	.07	1.00																				
ALLPAC	-.14	.15	.71	1.00																			
ECOAID	.36	.61	.01	.07	1.00																		
ECOADV	.60	.61	-.03	.05	.68	1.00																	
MILPERS	-.07	-.02	.48	.25	-.02	-.03	1.00																
DIPPERS	.09	.35	.09	.45	.22	.23	.04	1.00															
SECAID	.42	.68	.06	.08	.59	.37	-.00	.04	1.00														
TOURIST	-.16	.00	.78	.70	-.04	-.07	.43	.14	.01	1.00													
IMPORTS	-.12	.11	.75	.72	.04	.01	.62	.37	.06	.33	1.00												
EXPORTS	-.15	.04	.78	.71	-.00	-.02	.62	.22	.01	.89	.95	1.00											
MILPOP	-.08	-.03	.40	.26	-.03	-.04	.80	.01	-.01	.47	.46	.49	1.00										
DIPPOP	-.02	-.03	.01	.03	-.04	-.02	-.01	.11	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.01	1.00									
TOURPOP	-.10	-.02	.30	.30	-.04	-.05	.18	.01	-.01	.49	.22	.29	.70	.02	1.00								
EXSHARE	-.07	.01	.30	.26	-.00	-.02	.28	-.02	.03	.48	.26	.33	.74	-.01	.93	1.00							
INSHARE	-.06	-.02	.00	.13	-.02	-.03	.09	-.04	-.01	.28	.02	.08	.66	-.00	.95	.93	1.00						
AIDPOP	.36	.55	-.03	-.02	.66	.76	-.03	.06	.52	-.07	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.00	-.05	-.02	-.02	1.00					
SECBUG	.60	.36	-.04	-.01	.27	.56	-.02	.01	.39	-.05	-.04	-.03	-.03	-.00	-.03	.02	-.01	.53	1.00				
SECPop	.56	.73	.01	.03	.43	.53	-.01	.01	.74	-.01	.01	-.00	-.02	-.01	-.02	.02	-.01	.69	.62	1.00			
ARMSPOP	.48	.64	-.01	.01	.29	.49	-.02	.02	.47	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.02	.03	-.01	.00	-.02	.61	.50	.88	1.00		
STUDPOP	.43	.06	-.11	-.21	-.01	.12	-.05	-.08	.05	-.12	-.14	.13	-.06	.25	-.07	-.06	-.04	.31	.18	.15	.20	1.00	
ADVPOP	.54	.33	-.07	-.11	.25	.58	-.03	-.01	.23	-.08	-.08	-.07	-.04	.05	-.05	-.03	-.02	.81	.51	.50	.58	.52	1.00

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TABLE 5.7
MATRIX OF PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF SELECTED
INDICATORS OF SOVIET EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN 1973

	STUDENT	ARMS\$	MILPAC	ALLPAC	ECOVID	ECOADV	MILPERS	DIPPERS	SECAID	TOURIST	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	MILPOP	DIPPOP	TOURPOP	EXSHARE	IMSHARE	AIDPOP	SECBUDG	SECPOP	ARMSPOP	STUDPOP	ADVPPOP
STUDENT	1.00																						
ARMS\$.47	1.00																					
MILPAC	-.11	.04	1.00																				
ALLPAC	-.12	.08	.71	1.00																			
ECOVID	.49	.47	-.01	.02	1.00																		
ECOADV	.74	.62	.00	.03	.72	1.00																	
MILPERS	-.07	-.02	.46	.24	-.03	-.04	1.00																
DIPPERS	.09	.15	.11	.46	.20	.27	.07	1.00															
SECAID	.47	.84	.06	.07	.47	.52	-.02	.05	1.00														
TOURIST	-.10	-.00	.77	.56	-.04	-.04	.45	.04	.00	1.00													
IMPORTS	-.12	.03	.66	.71	-.01	-.01	.52	.49	.04	.69	1.00												
EXPORTS	-.12	.04	.72	.70	.02	.00	.55	.30	.07	.72	.89	1.00											
MILPOP	-.08	-.02	.42	.25	-.04	-.04	.55	.05	-.02	.35	.42	.47	1.00										
DIPPOP	-.01	-.02	.01	.04	-.05	-.05	-.00	.14	-.02	-.04	-.03	-.01	.04	1.00									
TOURPOP	-.09	-.00	.64	.46	-.04	-.05	.41	.02	-.01	.35	.60	.64	.33	-.03	1.00								
EXSHARE	-.05	-.00	.08	.07	-.02	-.02	.08	-.00	.01	.07	.12	.11	.24	.00	.09	1.00							
IMSHARE	-.05	-.01	.11	.14	-.02	-.03	.09	-.01	-.00	.03	.04	.09	.59	.08	.04	.46	1.00						
AIDPOP	.28	.31	-.04	-.04	.61	.39	-.02	.00	.27	-.04	-.06	-.04	-.03	-.00	-.03	-.02	-.02	1.00					
SECBUDG	.58	.62	.03	.00	.23	.50	-.02	.03	.53	-.03	-.04	-.03	-.02	.00	-.02	.00	-.01	.22	1.00				
SECPOP	.11	.94	.01	.02	.33	.48	-.01	.02	.73	-.01	-.01	.01	-.01	-.00	.00	-.00	-.01	.32	.71	1.00			
ARMSPOP	.39	.89	-.01	-.01	.25	.42	-.01	.02	.63	-.01	-.03	-.01	-.01	.01	.00	-.01	-.01	.30	.66	.95	1.00		
STUDPOP	.40	.10	-.11	-.22	.01	.10	-.05	-.09	.06	-.08	-.14	-.14	-.06	.21	-.07	-.05	-.04	.11	.15	.12	.17	1.00	
ADVPPOP	.54	.46	-.07	-.13	.34	.58	-.04	-.02	.35	-.06	-.10	-.08	-.04	.04	-.05	-.04	-.03	.51	.59	.52	.56	.44	1.00

TABLE 5.8
CHANGING DIRECTION OF SOVIET TRADE*

Country	Imports From Selected Countries, \$ US million		Soviet Market Share, %		
	1968	1973	1968	1973	Δ
Worldwide	7,111	15,532	100.0	100.0	---
Bulgaria	578	966	8.1	6.2	-23
Czechoslovakia	642	1,026	9.0	6.6	-27
East Germany	1,040	1,539	14.6	9.9	-32
Hungary	434	794	6.1	5.1	-16
Poland	668	1,135	9.4	7.3	-22
Romania	501	904	7.0	5.8	-17
Yugoslavia	228	475	3.2	2.3	-28
Australia	43	272	0.6	1.8	+20
Brazil	27	161	0.4	1.0	+150
Canada	91	321	1.3	2.1	+62
Japan	197	536	2.8	3.4	+21
USA	64	1,315	0.9	8.5	+100
West Germany	301	1,302	4.2	8.4	+844

*Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade and Europa Yearbooks.

FINDINGS

5.15 The most intriguing data associations were found to exist among the several manifestations of Soviet military and nonmilitary involvement in the Third World. First of all, unlike their U.S. and British counterpart programs, Soviet foreign military sales and military assistance are really two mutually related aspects of a single foreign military equipment transfer activity. Whereas the earlier studies of U.S. and British overseas activities indicated a strong separation between arms sales as a commercial activity and arms aid as a security-oriented engagement, in the Soviet case, both activities appear to be focused on the same set of recipient countries.

5.16 The close linkage between the two Soviet activities tends to confirm the predominantly political motivation behind Soviet arms transfer policy. Only those countries that either support Soviet policies or are anti-Western in orientation will receive Soviet arms (in the form of aid or trade). It should be recalled that it has only been for a few years that an unfavorable balance of trade in conjunction with skyrocketing petroleum prices compelled the U.S. itself to reassess its long-held view of arms transfers as a primary political, security-motivated activity and to increasingly emphasize economic benefit instead. As long as the Soviet Union remains largely insulated from international economic market forces, it presumably will have no strong incentive to depoliticize its foreign arms sales program. On the other hand, its growing need for foreign currency to pay for Western technology and food imports may force it to eventually adopt a more pragmatic approach in

its foreign arms dealings and to increasingly rely on military sales for economic gain.

5.17 Contrary to the U.S. experience, Soviet military and nonmilitary assistance programs reveal a moderate degree of integration. Correlation coefficients of 0.08 and -0.01 for the years 1968 and 1973, respectively, demonstrated the virtual absence of any relationship between the delivered dollar values of U.S. economic aid and security assistance, whereas the Soviet indices of 0.09 and 0.47 for the same 2 years (0.25, 0.29, 0.51, and 0.59 for the intervening years) indicate that Soviet economic aid recipients are increasingly likely to be the beneficiaries of military assistance as well.

5.18 The apparent trend toward a closer interrelationship between the military and nonmilitary components of Soviet overseas assistance programs is reinforced by the observed connection between the delivered values of arms sales and aid and the number of Soviet technical advisers that presumably accompany overseas development projects. Whereas the analysis of Soviet activities in 1968 revealed no significant relationship between arms sales and the size of its technical advisory contingents, the same examination 5 years later (1973) produced a strongly positive association of 0.62. Parenthetically, it should be pointed out that the U.S. and British patterns of international involvement tended to reveal a similar phenomenon.

5.19 One of the most surprising indicators of Soviet foreign involvement is the flow of foreign academic students and technical trainees to the Soviet Union. For instance, a

strong, positive relationship appears to be developing between the number of foreign students receiving their training in the U.S.S.R. and the magnitude of Soviet military and nonmilitary aid to the sending countries. Whereas a correlation of 0.19 expressed the relationship between students received and economic aid supplied in 1968, a coefficient of 0.49 had developed in 1973. Similarly, the relationship between student flows versus military sales and military aid grew from 0.39 to 0.47 and from 0.18 to 0.47, respectively. Finally, Soviet foreign student training programs appear to be increasingly related to the magnitude of Moscow's own in-country advisory role. This is apparent from the steady upward trend in association between the two activities: 0.34, 0.34, 0.49, 0.59, 0.60 and 0.74 for the years 1968 through 1973, respectively.

5.20 In sum, it appears that the Soviet Union has at least been moderately successful in converting its cultural exchange programs into other, more tangible forms of foreign penetration. To the U.S. policy planner, this finding suggests that careful monitoring and evaluation of the number of foreign nationals that leave for the Soviet Union to receive academic or technical training may provide one highly useful indicator of forthcoming Soviet economic or military aid programs.

5.21 Unlike the previously uncovered U.S. and British involvement profiles, no detectable relationship was found to exist between the Soviet economic aid effort and market penetration, which is expressed as the percentage of a country's total imports and exports that it derives from or ships to the Soviet Union. Instead, the amount of Soviet

trade penetration was correlated most highly (although decreasingly so) with the size of Soviet military deployments per capita of the host country's population, indicating that the Soviet external trading profile remains dominant almost exclusively in the occupied Eastern European countries.

5.22 The declining interdependence between the amount of Soviet commercial penetration and its local military profile (from 0.81 to 0.24 for the value of Soviet imports as a percentage of a country's worldwide exports and from 0.73 to 0.59 for the value of Soviet exports as a percentage of a country's worldwide imports) are indicative of a general redirection of Soviet trading patterns since 1968. Examination of the raw Soviet import and export data revealed that a very large growth in Soviet imports from Western countries (particularly the U.S. and West Germany) from 1968 to 1973 has been paralleled by relative decline in imports from Eastern European Bloc countries. Table 5.8 displays this trend.

5.23 The "Westernization" of Soviet imports in particular has been accompanied by an increasingly close statistical alignment between the direction of Soviet imports and the geographic distribution of Soviet diplomatic personnel. In other words, a most tenuous relationship of 0.23 in 1968 became transformed to a moderate correlation of 0.49 in 1973, suggesting that commercial concerns are taking on an increasingly important role in the duties of Soviet embassy staffs.

5.24 Soviet diplomatic representations in important aid-receiving countries, by contrast, appear to be undergoing quite the opposite phenomenon. A steady downward trend reduced the amount of statistical association between the

geographic distribution of economic assistance and the number of diplomatic personnel (from 0.41 in 1968 to 0.20 in 1973).

5.25 As previously observed, the use of absolute values, whether people or rubles, is probably only a partial measure of the importance of a country to the Soviet Union. A complementary indicator is the use of a criterion of proportion, i.e., some measure of Soviet resource allocation that takes into account the proportional size of a country in terms of its gross national product, population size, etc. For example, the knowledge that a total package value of \$5 million in Soviet economic assistance to Country A signified a \$100 disbursement per head of the receiving country's population, as compared with a \$100 million program to Country B and a per capita donation of \$10, sheds an altogether different light on the importance of Countries A and B as Soviet aid recipients. Altogether ten proportional, or secondary, variables were computed by controlling for such aggregate national attributes as population size, defense budgets, and a nation's total worldwide imports and exports.

5.26 The significance of the inclusion of the proportionate variables is most readily apparent in the area of Soviet security assistance. For instance, a very strong positive relationship was uncovered between the distribution of total dollar values of Soviet security assistance and its value per head of the receiving country's population (0.74, 0.82, 0.98, 0.83, 0.74, and 0.78 for 1968 through 1973, respectively). A similar, although less consistent, relationship showed up between the delivered absolute and the per capita values of Soviet arms sales (0.85, 0.24, 0.57, 0.40, 0.64, and 0.89

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ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL COMPETITION OF INTEREST AM--ETC(U)

APR 76 J S BREMER, M E MILLER

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for 1968 through 1973, respectively). Both phenomena indicate that the allocation of Soviet exports of military equipment seems to be dictated partly by some underlying criterion of recipient need.

5.27 A positive relationship, although not quite as succinct, also prevailed between the worldwide distribution of arms sales and security assistance and their proportionate contribution to the recipient countries' self-financed defense budgets. Thus an average correlation coefficient of 0.45 underlay the interaction between the allocation of the absolute delivered values of security assistance and its relative contributory value to the recipient countries' national defense burdens.

5.28 Interestingly, a strong relationship now appears to be developing between the per capita distribution of Soviet arms sales and security assistance and the number of technical advisers per head of the host countries' population. This occurrence reinforces the previously discovered linkage among the absolute values of the three variables.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

5.29 A most useful way of assessing the significance of the preceding findings is to compare them against observed relationships among different forms of U.S. worldwide involvement. In contrast to the U.S., one of the most distinguishing characteristics in the pattern of manifest Soviet involvement is the cohesiveness of the latter's arms export activities. Moreover, unlike the U.S., the geographic flow of Soviet arms transfers appears to be increasingly related

to other forms of Soviet political involvement, such as economic assistance and cultural exchange programs. Thus, whereas a product-moment correlation of mere -0.02 was found between the 1973 value of U.S. security assistance and the number of government-sponsored cultural exchanges, a coefficient of 0.47 prevailed between the two Soviet counterpart programs. The difference suggests that the Soviet leadership tends to view the training of the future elites in foreign countries as part of an integrated effort to extend its presence abroad, while the U.S. leans more toward viewing cultural exchanges as worthwhile political investments in and of themselves.

5.30 The previously discussed connection between Soviet arms sales and the number of nonmilitary advisors sent abroad is not particularly earthshaking when it is recalled that an even closer association has tended to dominate the equivalent U.S. activities. Thus, the Soviet coefficient in 1973 of 0.62 compares with an index of 0.90 for the same year for the U.S.

5.31 Like the Soviet Union, the size of U.S. embassy representations is related only moderately to commercial trade flows. Specifically, coefficients of 0.34 and 0.36 characterized the relationship in 1973 between the number of Department of State personnel abroad and the dollar value of U.S. imports and exports, respectively. In the Soviet instance, values of 0.49 and 0.30 were found. These moderate, although, for the Soviet Union, increasing, interrelationships contrast sharply with, for example, the British experience and are indicative, presumably, of the dominance of noncommercial concerns in U.S. and Soviet foreign affairs.

5.32 The main conclusion that can be drawn is that, despite a visible trend toward closer integration, the various manifestations of Soviet external involvement studied do not display the kind of tight cohesiveness with which it is often credited.

SOVIET FACTOR MODEL

5.33 Tables 5.9 through 5.14 display the final solutions of the orthogonally rotated factor matrices of Soviet interest data for the years 1968 through 1973. Data interpretation focuses mainly on the most recent, 1973 model. Loadings equal to or greater than 0.50 have been placed in parentheses and are the principal focus of the model's interpretation. Analysis centers on the 1973 results.

5.34 The right-most column portrays the communality of each variable, i.e., the proportion of a variable's total variation that is involved in all six patterns, or components. Multiplied by 100, the communality figures give the percent of variation that a variable has in common with each pattern. Subtracting the latter calculation from 100 determines the uniqueness of a variable, i.e., that portion of a variable that is not accounted for in the six patterns. In Table 5.14, for example, the variable ARMS\$ has a communality figure of 0.932, indicating that 93% of the arms sales aspect of Soviet involvement across 134 nations can be explained from knowledge of a country's value on the six patterns and the associated variables. In addition, it signifies that 7% of Soviet arms sales activities is unrelated to the other 22 types of Soviet activities portrayed in the six-dimensional factor model.

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TABLE 5.9
FINAL ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF MANIFEST
SOVIET INTEREST DATA IN 1968*

Variable	Component						Communalities
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Foreign Students in USSR	-.142	.073	-.031	.338	.413	(.568)	.660
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	-.010	.193	.030	.070	(.928)	.030	.906
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Military Treaties in Force	(.864)	-.023	.112	-.065	.003	-.029	.765
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Treaties in Force	(.722)	-.123	.108	.284	.038	-.352	.755
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	-.003	.003	-.005	(.904)	-.030	.006	.817
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad	-.029	.354	-.009	(.849)	.025	.094	.856
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad	(.728)	.026	.169	-.095	-.059	.263	.641
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy	.194	-.162	-.057	(.620)	.015	-.280	.530
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	-.017	(.834)	.004	.132	.224	-.056	.767
Soviet Tourists Abroad	(.845)	-.028	.254	-.004	.017	-.148	.801
Value of Soviet Imports	(.970)	-.030	.058	.064	.018	-.037	.951
Value of Soviet Exports	(.952)	-.024	.114	.035	.042	-.060	.926
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad per Country's Population	.467	.010	(.772)	-.068	-.066	.157	.848
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy per Country's Population	-.024	.044	.045	.039	-.114	-.025	.020
Soviet Tourists Abroad Per Country's Population	.184	-.019	(.952)	-.006	-.027	-.088	.949
Value of Soviet Imports per Country's Total Exports	.300	-.003	(.921)	-.005	-.010	-.033	.939
Value of Soviet Exports per Country's Total Imports	-.015	-.016	(.990)	-.003	-.035	-.041	.983
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	-.042	.395	.007	(.674)	.015	.258	.678
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Self-Financed Defense Expenditures	-.028	(.852)	-.023	.025	-.029	.046	.730
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	-.032	(.888)	-.004	.037	.194	-.058	.831
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) per Country's Population	-.020	.446	.031	.042	(.848)	-.043	.922
Foreign Students in USSR per Country's Population	-.037	-.021	-.029	-.043	.016	(.724)	.529
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad per Country's Population	-.064	(.625)	-.017	.397	-.076	.402	.720

Note: The components are as follows:

1. Military Assistance
2. Military Commercial Activity
3. Commercial Penetration
4. Political Activity
5. Political Visibility
6. Diplomatic Activity.

*Variable loadings equal to or greater than .0.500 are in parentheses.

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TABLE 5.10
FINAL ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF MANIFEST
SOVIET INTEREST DATE IN 1969*

Variable	Component						Communalities
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Foreign Students in USSR	-.158	.115	-.044	.354	.448	.377	.508
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	.002	(.863)	.008	.143	.062	.011	.770
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Military Treaties in Force	(.866)	-.070	.119	-.043	-.036	-.029	.773
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Treaties in Force	(.731)	.346	.108	.015	-.134	-.051	.687
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	-.011	(.824)	.005	.072	.448	-.103	.896
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad	-.021	(.522)	-.008	.269	(.667)	-.133	.809
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad	(.709)	-.136	.183	-.031	.100	.002	.566
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdic- tion of Embassy	.177	(.782)	-.059	-.030	-.038	.118	.662
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	.025	.151	.001	(.848)	.080	-.139	.768
Soviet Tourists Abroad	(.866)	.023	.237	-.001	-.084	-.012	.814
Value of Soviet Imports	(.957)	.126	.058	.022	-.012	-.042	.937
Value of Soviet Exports	(.951)	.096	.122	.033	-.030	-.018	.931
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad per Country's Population	.454	-.093	(.773)	-.030	.053	-.006	.816
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdic- tion of Embassy per Country's Population	.001	.102	-.009	-.038	-.070	(.621)	.403
Soviet Tourists Abroad Per Country's Populations	.220	.014	(.941)	-.009	-.063	.003	.938
Value of Soviet Imports per Country's Total Exports	.303	-.001	(.925)	.022	-.000	-.033	.949
Value of Soviet Exports per Country's Total Imports	-.024	.006	(.987)	-.009	-.028	-.016	.976
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	-.014	.124	-.009	.052	(.868)	-.028	.773
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Self- Financed Defense Expenditures	-.021	-.073	-.012	(.574)	.170	-.076	.370
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	.012	.063	.005	(.954)	.014	.023	.915
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) per Country's Population	.007	.103	-.003	(.639)	.108	.299	.521
Foreign Students in USSR per Country's Population	-.058	-.123	-.011	.022	.162	(.685)	.514
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad per Country's Population	-.030	-.027	-.019	.158	(.820)	.174	.730

Note: The components are as follows:

1. Military Assistance
2. Military Commercial Activity
3. Commercial Penetration
4. Political Activity
5. Political Visibility
6. Diplomatic Activity.

*Variable loadings equal to or greater than .0.500 are in parentheses.

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TABLE 5.11
FINAL ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF MANIFEST
SOVIET INTEREST DATA IN 1970*

Variable	Component						Communalities
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Foreign Students in USSR	-.134	.007	-.050	(.577)	-.001	(.563)	.670
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	.038	(.946)	-.013	.105	.080	-.080	.920
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Military Treaties in Force	(.858)	-.056	.082	.072	.051	-.029	.754
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Treaties in Force	(.706)	.067	.110	.013	(.504)	-.210	.813
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	.013	.224	-.014	(.824)	.172	-.209	.803
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad	-.013	.166	-.013	(.916)	.125	.019	.883
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad	(.750)	.023	.126	.005	-.315	.093	.688
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy	.178	.065	-.051	.208	(.743)	-.147	.655
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	.017	(.957)	-.002	.044	.017	-.057	.922
Soviet Tourists Abroad	(.864)	-.049	.214	-.071	.135	-.046	.820
Value of Soviet Imports	(.951)	.114	.046	-.011	.107	-.063	.935
Value of Soviet Exports	(.972)	.008	.065	.016	.045	-.036	.952
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad per Country's Population	(.518)	-.003	(.734)	-.002	-.220	.052	.859
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy per Country's Population	-.052	-.008	.015	-.106	(.521)	.380	.430
Soviet Tourists Abroad Per Country's Populations	.246	-.022	(.942)	-.037	.074	-.032	.956
Value of Soviet Imports per Country's Total Exports	.050	.004	(.994)	-.011	.006	-.020	.992
Value of Soviet Exports per Country's Total Imports	.031	-.007	(.986)	-.013	.004	-.026	.974
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	-.011	.151	-.006	(.879)	-.046	-.038	.799
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Self- Financed Defense Expenditures	-.005	.450	.006	.186	.108	.329	.357
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	.018	(.959)	-.001	.139	.007	-.006	.940
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) per Country's Population	-.008	(.623)	-.013	.106	-.053	.033	.403
Foreign Students in USSR per Country's Population	-.030	-.009	-.021	-.001	-.043	(.743)	.555
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad per Country's Population	-.050	.033	-.012	(.703)	-.085	.305	.598

Note: The components are as follows:

1. Military Assistance
2. Military Commercial Activity
3. Commercial Penetration
4. Political Activity
5. Political Visibility
6. Diplomatic Activity.

*Variable loadings equal to or greater than .500 are in parentheses.

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TABLE 5.12
FINAL ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF MANIFEST
SOVIET INTEREST DATA IN 1971*

Variable	Component						Communalities
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Foreign Students in USSR	(.549)	-.120	-.030	.489	-.034	.182	.590
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	.009	.041	-.005	(.622)	-.020	(.589)	.736
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Military Treaties in Force	-.081	(.817)	.063	-.014	.221	.083	.734
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Treaties in Force	-.182	(.645)	.076	-.022	.245	.456	.723
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	.221	-.020	.018	(.567)	-.016	(.633)	.772
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad	.496	-.045	.027	(.505)	-.008	.481	.734
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad	.048	(.835)	.168	.026	-.209	-.168	.800
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy	-.011	.172	-.057	-.040	-.056	(.838)	.740
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	-.122	.048	-.010	(.859)	.020	.075	.761
Soviet Tourists Abroad	-.015	.256	.028	.030	(.939)	-.032	.949
Value of Soviet Imports	-.071	(.916)	.018	.051	.274	.148	.945
Value of Soviet Exports	-.045	(.924)	.059	-.006	.252	.083	.930
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad per Country's Population	.019	(.592)	(.734)	-.007	-.155	-.117	.928
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy per Country's Population	.268	.004	-.027	-.220	-.017	.159	.146
Soviet Tourists Abroad Per Country's Population	-.002	.210	.033	-.006	(.952)	-.028	.953
Value of Soviet Imports per Country's Total Exports	-.036	.132	(.974)	.002	.113	.002	.981
Value of Soviet Exports per Country's Total Imports	-.045	.003	(.979)	-.024	.023	.010	.961
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	(.731)	-.042	-.002	.417	.004	.101	.720
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Self-Financed Defense Expenditures	.256	-.006	.012	(.635)	.013	.035	.470
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	.087	.036	-.006	(.911)	.026	.028	.841
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) per Country's Population	.196	-.003	-.025	.428	-.012	-.022	.223
Foreign Students in USSR per Country's Population	(.718)	-.065	-.043	-.055	-.017	-.155	.549
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad per Country's Population	(.821)	-.042	.003	.322	.009	.025	.780

Note: The components are as follows:

1. Military Assistance
2. Military Commercial Activity
3. Commercial Penetration
4. Political Activity
5. Political Visibility
6. Diplomatic Activity.

*Variable loadings equal to or greater than 0.500 are in parentheses.

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TABLE 5.13
FINAL ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF MANIFEST
SOVIET INTEREST DATA IN 1972*

Variable	Component						Communalities
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Foreign Students in USSR	(.691)	-.153	-.054	.307	.100	.137	.627
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) (SUS Millions)	(.774)	.089	-.003	-.167	.339	-.153	.772
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Military Treaties in Force	.014	(.867)	.105	-.037	-.043	.043	.768
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Treaties in Force	.007	(.806)	.125	-.044	.299	-.233	.811
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) (SUS Millions)	(.591)	-.065	-.001	-.239	(.562)	.150	.749
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad	(.712)	-.081	-.016	.080	.473	.238	.601
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad	-.032	(.565)	.137	-.056	-.094	(.673)	.805
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy	.011	.270	-.050	.078	(.798)	-.148	.740
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) SUS Millions)	(.754)	.067	.011	-.282	.036	-.171	.683
Soviet Tourists Abroad	-.034	(.880)	.292	-.004	-.026	-.011	.861
Value of Soviet Imports	-.012	(.936)	.032	-.046	.155	.169	.932
Value of Exports	-.021	(.944)	.095	-.023	.025	.174	.933
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad per Country's Population	-.035	.398	(.693)	-.039	-.069	.497	.894
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy per Country's Population	-.073	.056	.039	(.616)	.137	-.320	.510
Soviet Tourists Abroad Per Country's Population	-.027	.212	(.957)	.015	-.001	-.048	.964
Value of Soviet Imports per Country's Total Exports	.014	.224	(.944)	-.021	-.025	.057	.945
Value of Soviet Exports per Country's Total Imports	-.013	-.017	(.992)	-.002	.002	-.18	.984
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) per country's Population	(.824)	-.077	-.015	.190	.209	.215	.811
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Self- Financed Defense Expenditure	(.698)	-.025	-.005	.169	-.071	.072	.527
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	(.938)	.060	.004	-.049	-.135	-.156	.929
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) per Country's Population	(.833)	.056	-.004	.104	-.171	-.146	.758
Foreign Students in USSR per Country's Population	.225	-.127	-.044	(.772)	-.116	.133	.695
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad per Country's Population	(.651)	-.094	-.028	(.524)	-.004	.253	.771

Note: The components are as follows:

1. Military Assistance
2. Military Commercial Activity
3. Commercial Penetration
4. Political Activity
5. Political Visibility
6. Diplomatic Activity.

*Variable loadings equal to or greater than .0.500 are in parentheses.

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TABLE 5.14
FINAL ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX OF MANIFEST
SOVIET INTEREST DATA IN 1973*

Variable	Component						Communalities
	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Foreign Students in USSR	.043	-.097	-.070	(.608)	.355	.018	.672
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) (\$US Millions)	(.922)	.015	.005	-.259	-.028	.112	.932
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Military Treaties in Force	.023	(.852)	.057	-.032	-.049	-.084	.739
Soviet Bilateral/Multilateral Treaties in Force	.055	(.670)	.038	-.065	-.141	(.534)	.762
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered)(\$US Millions)	.202	-.028	-.001	(.857)	-.156	.164	.827
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad	.428	-.026	-.023	(.760)	.064	.208	.809
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad	-.063	(.657)	.382	.053	.099	-.174	.625
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy	.005	.147	-.002	.156	.024	(.867)	.799
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) \$US Millions)	(.793)	.022	.017	.270	-.109	.077	.720
Soviet Tourists Abroad	.000	(.907)	-.052	-.036	-.030	-.077	.833
Value of Soviet Imports	-.009	(.831)	.068	-.025	-.060	.389	.851
Value of Soviet Exports	.012	(.874)	.101	-.011	-.061	.252	.842
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad per Country's Population	-.050	(.515)	(.743)	.030	.097	-.122	.845
Soviet Personnel Under Jurisdiction of Embassy per Country's Population	-.007	-.060	.101	-.183	(.613)	.366	.556
Soviet Tourists Abroad Per Country's Population	.008	(.836)	-.034	-.042	-.017	-.127	.718
Value of Soviet Imports per Country's Total Exports	.028	.007	(.666)	-.039	-.089	.051	.456
Value of Soviet Exports per Country's Total Imports	.005	-.001	(.863)	-.029	.012	.245	.748
Soviet Economic Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	.156	-.012	-.007	(.717)	.010	-.111	.551
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Self- Financed Defense Expenditures	(.750)	-.010	-.010	.206	.208	-.039	.650
Soviet Security Assistance (Delivered) per Country's Population	(.969)	.007	-.007	.143	.017	-.027	.961
Soviet Arms Sales (Delivered) per Country's Population	(.926)	.001	-.002	-.086	.093	-.059	.877
Foreign Students in USSR per Country's Population	.082	-.069	-.093	.128	(.811)	-.169	.723
Soviet Economic Technicians Abroad Per Country's Population	.465	-.027	-.052	(.503)	.458	-.166	.710

Note: The components are as follows:

1. Military Assistance
2. Military Commercial Activity
3. Commercial Penetration
4. Political Activity
5. Political Visibility
6. Diplomatic Activity.

*Variable loadings equal to or greater than .0.500 are in parentheses.

5.35 To enhance cross-comparability with the previously obtained U.S. and British interest profiles, it was decided to deliberately constrain the Soviet solution to six orthogonal factors. This use of a constrained six-dimensional model implied the employment of a default eigenvalue somewhat greater than 1.0--the most commonly specified minimum criterion to determine the number of factors. ^{2/} Use of this eigenvalue signified, in turn, a quite acceptable loss of 21% to 26% of the total amount of variance contained in the original data.

5.36 Inspection of the important (≥ 0.500) variable loadings on each of the individual dimensions or components (Table 5.14) confirmed that each factor did indeed encompass a discrete manifestation of Soviet worldwide involvement. The first component was restricted exclusively to the various indicators of Soviet arms export activities, suggesting the existence of a discrete Military Assistance Activity dimension in Soviet foreign policy.

5.37 The second component contained what might be considered the most enduring, or "routinized," manifestations of the Soviet interest abroad, such as tourist flows, trade, formalized international relationship (i.e., treaties), and military deployments. The label Military-Commercial Activity appeared to describe this facet of Soviet international relations most succinctly.

^{2/} The actual minimum eigenvalues used ranged between 1.05 and 1.28, depending on the particular annual data set analyzed.

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5.38 The third component in the Soviet 1973 interest profile separated out the two principal indicators of Soviet commercial dominance, i.e., the Soviet share of a country's exports and the share of imports. This phenomenon echoes similar findings in the U.S. and British profiles and expresses Commercial Penetration.

5.39 Military and nonmilitary aid abroad as unique, separate aspects of Soviet overseas involvement are indicated by the formation of an independent aggregation of economic aid variables in the fourth component. The political nature of the bulk of Soviet development assistance suggested that the fourth component be labeled Political Activity.

5.40 The fifth component is distinctive for its grouping of two important indicators of Soviet local political visibility, i.e., the number of Soviet diplomatic personnel per head of the host country's population and the number of foreign students Moscow sponsors in proportion to the size of the local population. This dimension was labeled Political Visibility.

5.41 Finally, the sixth factor reveals a second loading for the Soviet worldwide treaty inventory in conjunction with the apportionment of its diplomatic personnel and, as such, appears descriptive of a Diplomatic Activity phenomenon.

INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

5.42 One of the more distinctive traits of the overall Soviet interest model is the statistical separation between aid- and non-aid-oriented activities. Presumably,

Components II, III, and VI (Table 5.14), which are characterized by formalized commercial and diplomatic activities, express the Soviet interest in the industrialized half of the world. This is also that part of the international system that affects the welfare and security of the Soviet Union most immediately and is therefore of intrinsic interest to Moscow. Components I, IV, and V, on the other hand, express various manifestations of Soviet influence-seeking--through cultural exchanges, economic aid, or military assistance--and, as such, appear to reflect the Soviet interest in the Third World.

5.43 The statistical separation between Soviet Military Assistance (Component I) and Political Activity (Component IV) confirms that, generally speaking, military and economic assistance are viewed and implemented as two, independent instruments of Soviet foreign policy; no consistent relationship appears to prevail between the direction of Soviet military aid and the allocation of development assistance. Thus, while a number of Third World countries do indeed benefit from both forms of aid simultaneously, no proportionate relationship exists between the two resource flows. Moreover, this finding signifies that a halt in Soviet economic assistance to one country does not necessarily imply a stoppage of military aid, or vice versa. Evidently, a Soviet decision to provide military or economic assistance is based on considerations other than those purely political. Presumably, the question of the recipient's need or the sensitivity of one form of aid versus another plays some role in the allocation of Soviet resources to the Third World.

5.44 From the perspective of effective U.S. policy formulation, the independent character of Soviet economic versus military aid suggests that U.S. economic aid and Soviet military aid programs (or vice versa) may, in fact, coexist noncompetitively within the same recipient country. Indeed, the use of an alternative, rather than a similar, aid program may constitute the most effective and risk-free way of offsetting a competing power's presence abroad.

5.45 The Soviet Military-Commercial Activity dimension is virtually identical to the previously uncovered interrelationship of similar U.S. variables. A person with no knowledge of the substantive differences between the U.S. and Soviet Union might conclude, on the basis of the statistics alone, that the relationship between flag and trade is the same for both countries. The statistical results for both countries intimate that the U.S. and the Soviet Union tend to deploy their respective military forces to protect their trade interests. In fact, of course, any notion of causality is purely speculative; at most, it could be argued that important commercial stakes are a contributory reason for both superpowers to maintain a substantial military presence in Europe.

5.46 Variables such as levels of trade, treaty relationships, and tourist flows are generally "static" in nature, i.e., barring highly dramatic events, such as war or a trade embargo, they tend to undergo change in a slow, orderly manner. Other indicators of involvement, such as the extension of aid or the provision of advisory personnel, on the other hand, are significantly more "manipulatable" instruments of a nation's external activities and are, in principle

at least, prone to more frequent and rapid changes. The implication of this distinction is that countries that rank high in terms of Soviet Military-Commercial Activity (Component II) may be expected to do so consistently across time, whereas countries dominated by other dimensions of Soviet involvement (e.g., Military Assistance) are more likely to fluctuate on the scale of the Soviet interest. In addition, it may be postulated that if the reduction or elimination of Soviet presence and, by implication, Soviet influence is one of the objectives of U.S. policy, this task is likely to stand a much greater chance of success if focused on those areas of the world that rank relatively low in terms of Soviet Military-Commercial Activity. Conversely, it will be extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to succeed in eliminating a broad-based Western presence that is founded on extensive commercial or cultural links, such as in Portugal and Algeria, simply by providing generous doses of military or economic aid. If, on the other hand, the Soviets were to expand their involvement to include a strongly developed commercial relationship that is backed by an intensive network of treaty relationships (and the paraphernalia of organizational links that tend to result), it would be extremely difficult for the West to regain its previously established position. The evolving Soviet link with India over the past 10 to 15 years, initially limited to a donor-recipient relationship but now including a highly developed commercial network, exemplifies this phenomenon.

5.47 The close interrelationship between the proportionate Soviet military presence abroad and the two indicators of commercial penetration suggests that, in the aggregate, the impact of Soviet trade continues to be felt primarily in

Eastern Europe, i.e., the principal region that hosts large numbers of Soviet combat troops on its soil.

5.48 The Soviet Political Activity dimension (Component IV) stands out for its integration of the absolute and the proportionate indicators of Soviet nonmilitary involvement in the developing countries. As appeared to be the case in the close relationship between the absolute and per capita distribution of Soviet arms sales and security assistance, so, again, the recipient country's population size appears to be one determinant of the relative amount of Soviet aid it is likely to receive. The larger the population, the more assistance it may expect. A similar relationship was found to typify U.S. aid disbursement policy, although not quite as strongly.

5.49 Interestingly, a close association was found to exist between the per capita derivatives of Soviet embassy personnel and the number of foreign students hosted by the Soviet Union. This finding tends to confirm, first of all, the political significance of Soviet foreign student programs, and, secondly, it suggests that Moscow apparently perceives a high diplomatic profile as a useful means to reinforce whatever political gains it derives from proportionately high levels of student exchanges.

5.50 The sixth component, labeled Diplomatic Activity, contains a second moderately high loading for treaty arrangements in conjunction with a high loading for the number of Soviet diplomatic personnel stationed abroad. The virtually solitary location of the latter variable indicates the unique role of Soviet foreign service personnel.

The implication of the statistical unrelatedness of this indicator from the remainder of the variables may be two-fold. First, it may indicate that Soviet diplomatic staffs perform a role quite unrelated to any of the other types of activities examined, i.e., commerce, security, and support of Soviet development policies in the Third World. However, it may be that Soviet embassy activities are so diffused across all three forms of engagements that a clear-cut statistical relationship with any one simply cannot be confirmed. In either case, the distribution of Soviet foreign service personnel is quite distinct from that which was shown in the U.S. or British profiles. U.S. Department of State personnel were clustered most heavily in security-oriented activities (e.g., military aid), while their British counterparts were most heavily represented in high levels of trade and private investment.

CONCLUSIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST PROFILE

5.51 The following general conclusions can be drawn from the profile of the Soviet international stake. First, on the broadest plane, the Soviet interest abroad, as manifested in observed patterns of involvement, does not display the kind of interactivity cohesiveness that it is frequently claimed to possess. Thus, Soviet commerce is not integrated into the flow of foreign assistance, while foreign assistance, in turn, is composed of two, independent military and developmental components.

5.52 Secondly, Soviet involvement throughout the international system clearly distinguishes between activities focused on the industrialized half of the world and those that center on the developing countries. This phenomenon

is evident from the clear separation between overseas aid activities and more formalized commercial engagements.

5.53 The third conclusion reached is that Soviet military and nonmilitary assistance appear to be utilized as two separate instruments of Soviet influence seeking. That is to say, no linear relationship was found to exist between the volume and direction of Soviet military assistance and the economic aid disbursements. Apparently, the Soviets view giving economic versus military aid on individual merit and not as interdependent parts of a general foreign assistance program.

5.54 The fourth conclusion is that Soviet foreign trade remains centered by and large on those countries that host large numbers of Soviet military personnel, i.e., primarily Eastern Europe. This evidence plus the available raw statistics on the worldwide flow of Soviet trade confirm that the Soviet Union continues to be a minor participant in the world commercial market.

5.55 Finally, it is apparent that the size of the recipient country's population is an important determinant of the volume of both Soviet economic aid and military assistance.

5.56 The preceding interpretation of the Soviet worldwide interest profile was based principally on the variable interrelationships that were demonstrated in the orthogonal factor selection of the 1973 data. Examination of five preceding years of data (1968-1972) did not produce results that significantly altered either the overall composition of the 1973 model or the general observations that were

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derived from it. It is maintained that despite the apparent irregularity in location on the part of a few individual variables from year to year, the 1973 solution is indeed a valid representation of the prevailing structure of Soviet worldwide involvement. ^{3/}

COUNTRY SCORING

5.57 The final step in the analysis of the dimensions and direction of the Soviet interest abroad was to score each of the 134 countries studied on each of the separate six components, as well as on an aggregate, or composite, indicator of the Soviet interest.

5.58 Individual six-dimensional scores were obtained using the formula $Y = XG$, where Y is the factor score matrix, X the standardized values of the cases (countries) on each variable, and G the transformation matrix. The matrices are, in turn, defined as follows:

- F is a matrix of eigenvectors, each normalized to its eigenvalue, i.e., $FF' = \lambda$, where λ is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues.
- The matrix $G = F\lambda^{-1}$, where the column vectors of G are obtained by dividing

^{3/} Subsequent to the completion of this report, an examination of Soviet 1974 data resulted in a terminal factor solution identical to 1973.

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each column of F by its corresponding eigenvalue. ^{4/}

5.59 Table 5.15 displays the resulting matrix of dimensional and composite scores for the top 30 countries examined in 1973. Scoring results for the preceding 5 years will be contained in the final project report.

5.60 Calculation of composite scores for all countries was accomplished by multiplying each country's six individual dimensional scores by the pertinent final eigenvalues and then dividing the summed products of this computation by the sum of final eigenvalues.

5.61 The conceptual rationale for developing cross-national composite scores was based on the proposition that the total amount of variance accounted for by each of the six dimensions of the Soviet interest was a reasonable approximation of the "real world" composition of the Soviet interest.

5.62 Table 5.16 lists 6 years of composite scores for the 25 highest ranking countries in the population.

5.63 A somewhat different perspective on changes in country positions over the 6 years studied is provided in Table 5.17.

^{4/} See John P. Vande Geer, Introduction to Multivariate Analysis for the Social Sciences, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Co., 1971, pp. 128-155.

1973 HIERARCHY OF TOP 30 COUNTRIES ON SIX COMPONENTS OF MANIFEST SOVIET INTEREST ABROAD

Component I Military Assistance		Component II Military-Commercial Activity		Component III Commercial Penetration		Component IV Political Activity	
Syria	6.56	East Germany	6.32	Mongolia	9.54	Guinea	9.20
Egypt	2.76	Poland	4.79	North Vietnam	4.44	Algeria	7.52
Iraq	2.34	Bulgaria	4.16	East Germany	4.13	Syria	7.37
Afghanistan	1.09	Hungary	2.96	Czechoslovakia	0.83	Egypt	6.35
Somalia	0.78	Romania	2.59	Hungary	0.75	Bangladesh	5.17
South Yemen	0.37	Czechoslovakia	2.33	Bulgaria	0.45	India	4.71
India	0.29	Germany	1.34	Cuba	0.25	Iraq	4.25
Iran	0.21	Finland	1.16	Poland	0.11	Turkey	4.07
Mali	0.14	Yugoslavia	1.13	Egypt	0.06	Afghanistan	3.72
Cuba	0.12	Mongolia	0.96	North Korea	0.06	Somalia	3.49
Bangladesh	0.03	United States	0.93	Afghanistan	0.00	Iran	3.41
Yugoslavia	0.02	Japan	0.86	Romania	-0.08	Congo	2.16
Libya	-0.02	P.R.C.	0.79	Syria	-0.09	South Yemen	1.64
Algeria	-0.05	France	0.58	Finland	-0.12	Nigeria	1.14
Guinea	-0.09	Egypt	0.58	Yugoslavia	-0.13	Chile	0.74
Peru	-0.10	India	0.44	India	-0.14	Pakistan	0.49
Uganda	-0.10	Cuba	0.37	Somalia	-0.14	Mali	0.44
Finland	-0.10	Italy	0.37	Iraq	-0.14	Ken. African Rep.	0.41
Sudan	-0.11	Austria	0.23	Bangladesh	-0.15	North Yemen	0.26
Morocco	-0.11	North Korea	0.07	South Yemen	-0.15	Uganda	0.21
Congo	-0.11	Sweden	0.05	Algeria	-0.15	Jordan	0.18
Pakistan	-0.11	Albania	0.01	Iceland	-0.15	Morocco	0.17
Nepal	-0.12	Canada	0.01	Turkey	-0.15	Zambia	0.04
Ethiopia	-0.12	United Kingdom	0.00	North Yemen	-0.16	Tanzania	0.03
P.R.C.	-0.12	Iran	0.00	Morocco	-0.16	Ethiopia	0.03
Burundi	-0.12	Norway	-0.02	Ghana	-0.16	Sudan	0.02
Burma	-0.12	Netherlands	-0.03	Cyprus	-0.16	Mauritania	-0.04
Czechoslovakia	-0.12	Australia	-0.03	Sudan	-0.16	Kenya	-0.07
Bulgaria	-0.12	Denmark	-0.04	Guyana	-0.16	Sierra Leone	-0.07
Dahomey	-0.12	Iraq	-0.04	Iran	-0.16	Cyprus	-0.10

TABLE 5.15 (Cont)

Component V Political Visibility	Component VI Diplomatic Activity	Composite Score
Cyprus	5.05	2.21
Congo	4.00	1.73
Iceland	3.87	1.31
Jordan	1.43	1.08
South Yemen	1.39	0.93
Finland	0.93	0.92
Mauritania	0.92	0.84
Lebanon	0.92	0.70
Central African Rep.	0.90	0.68
Syria	0.90	0.56
Mauritius	0.90	0.56
Sierra Leone	0.81	0.52
Somalia	0.80	0.51
Gambia	0.72	0.43
U.A.E.	0.55	0.40
Switzerland	0.51	0.39
Kuwait	0.49	0.38
Costa Rica	0.37	0.33
Mali	0.29	0.28
Guinea	0.25	0.24
Algeria	0.24	0.22
Equatorial Guinea	0.20	0.22
Austria	0.19	0.21
Mongolia	0.18	0.21
Afghanistan	0.15	0.19
Denmark	0.14	0.19
Togo	0.14	0.17
Guinea-Bissau	0.11	0.14
Panama	0.09	0.11
Senegal	0.08	0.10

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TABLE 5.16

CROSS-NATIONAL COMPOSITE SOVIET INTEREST SCORES
FOR TOP 25 COUNTRIES, 1968-1973

1968		1969		1970		1971		1972		1973	
Mongolia	1.71	Mongolia	1.68	Mongolia	1.97	Egypt	1.81	Syria	2.07	Syria	2.21
Ea. Germany	1.54	Ea. Germany	1.57	Egypt	1.85	Ea. Germany	1.70	Ea. Germany	1.70	Ea. Germany	1.73
Algeria	1.27	Egypt	1.29	Ea. Germany	1.68	Mongolia	1.35	Mongolia	1.63	Egypt	1.31
Syria	1.09	India	1.21	Poland	1.08	Syria	1.15	Egypt	1.56	Poland	1.08
Poland	1.01	Poland	1.05	Syria	0.97	Poland	1.00	Poland	0.98	Mongolia	0.92
Bulgaria	0.77	Iraq	0.99	Iran	0.93	Iran	0.94	Iran	0.89	Bulgaria	0.91
Czechoslovakia	0.76	Bulgaria	0.832	Czechoslovakia	0.84	Czechoslovakia	0.81	Bulgaria	0.75	Iraq	0.84
Egypt	0.73	Czechoslovakia	0.75	Algeria	0.77	Bulgaria	0.74	Czechoslovakia	0.75	India	0.69
Sudan	0.67	Iran	0.65	India	0.71	India	0.71	Iraq	0.74	Hungary	0.67
India	0.65	Hungary	0.62	Bulgaria	0.69	Algeria	0.70	India	0.72	Romania	0.56
Hungary	0.62	Syria	0.60	Hungary	0.68	Hungary	0.65	Algeria	0.64	Czechoslovakia	0.55
No. Yemen	0.57	Cuba	0.58	Romania	0.51	Afghanistan	0.54	Congo	0.63	Afghanistan	0.52
Cuba	0.53	Afghanistan	0.53	Finland	0.46	Romania	0.48	Hungary	0.62	Guinea	0.51
So. Yemen	0.47	Congo	0.48	Afghanistan	0.38	Congo	0.47	Guinea	0.62	Algeria	0.43
Romania	0.44	Algeria	0.47	Iraq	0.38	Finland	0.46	Afghanistan	0.61	Finland	0.39
Iran	0.42	Romania	0.42	Yugoslavia	0.31	Iraq	0.32	Finland	0.46	United States	0.39
Congo	0.37	No. Yemen	0.42	Cuba	0.30	Guinea	0.32	Romania	0.44	Somalia	0.37
Iraq	0.36	Finland	0.42	U.A.E.	0.24	Cuba	0.26	Somalia	0.40	Iran	0.33
Afghanistan	0.36	Yugoslavia	0.21	Congo	0.23	So. Yemen	0.25	So. Yemen	0.29	Germany	0.27
Yugoslavia	0.34	Japan	0.17	Japan	0.19	Turkey	0.21	United States	0.22	Congo	0.23
Finland	0.33	France	0.17	United States	0.16	Yugoslavia	0.18	Cyprus	0.21	Bangladesh	0.22
Somalia	0.29	Germany	0.14	Guinea	0.16	United States	0.16	Cuba	0.20	Yugoslavia	0.22
U.A.E.	0.16	United States	0.13	France	0.15	Cyprus	0.15	Japan	0.16	N. Vietnam	0.21
Japan	0.15	Italy	0.11	Libya	0.12	Somalia	0.11	Yugoslavia	0.16	Turkey	0.20
France	0.14	Iceland	0.11	Somalia	0.11	France	0.10	Bangladesh	0.15	Cyprus	0.19

TABLE 5.17
ORDINAL AND LOCATIONAL TRENDS IN CROSS-NATIONAL
COMPOSITE SCORES, 1968-1973

Value*	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
2.3						
2.2						Syria
2.1					Syria	
2.0						
1.9			Mongolia			
1.8			Egypt	Egypt		
1.7	Mongolia		Ea. Germany	Ea. Germany	Ea. Germany	Ea. Germany
1.6		Mongolia	Ea. Germany		Mongolia	
1.5	Ea. Germany	Ea. Germany			Egypt	
1.4						
1.3				Mongolia		Egypt
1.2	Algeria	Egypt India				
1.1				Syria		
1.0	Syria Poland	Poland	Poland	Poland		Poland

* Composite score.

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TABLE 5.17 (Cont)

Value*	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
0.98		Iraq			Poland	
0.96			Syria			
0.94						
0.92			Iran	Iran		Mongolia
0.90						Bulgaria
0.88						
0.86					Iran	
0.84			Czechoslovakia			Iraq
0.82		Bulgaria		Czechoslovakia		
0.80						
0.78						
0.76	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia		Algeria			
0.74		Czechoslovakia		Bulgaria	Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Iraq	
0.72	Egypt			India	India	
0.70			India	Algeria		
0.68	Sudan		Bulgaria Hungary			India
0.66						Hungary
0.64	India	Iran		Hungary	Algeria	
0.62	Hungary	Hungary			Congo Hungary Guinea	
0.60		Syria			Afghanistan	
0.58		Cuba				
0.56	No. Yemen					Romania
0.54				Afghanistan		Czechoslovakia
0.52	Cuba	Afghanistan				Afghanistan
0.50			Romania			Guinea
0.48		Congo		Romania		
0.46	So. Yemen	Algeria	Finland	Congo Finland	Finland	
0.44					Romania	

* Composite score.

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TABLE 5.17 (Cont)

Value*	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
0.43	Romania					Algeria
0.42		Romania No. Yemen Finland				
0.41	Iran					
0.40					Somalia	
0.39						Finland United States
0.38			Afghanistan Iraq			
0.37	Congo					Somalia
0.36	Iraq Afghanistan					
0.35						
0.34	Yugoslavia					
0.33	Finland					Iran
0.32				Iraq Guinea		
0.31			Yugoslavia Cuba			
0.30					So. Yemen	
0.29	Somalia					
0.28						Germany
0.27						
0.26						
0.25				Cuba		
0.24			UAE	So. Yemen		
0.23			Congo			Congo
0.22					United States	Bangladesh Yugoslavia
0.21		Yugoslavia		Turkey	Cyprus	N. Vietnam
0.20					Cuba	Turkey
0.19			Japan			Cyprus
0.18				Yugoslavia		France
0.17		Japan France				
0.16	UAE		United States Guinea		Japan Yugoslavia	So. Yemen
0.15	Japan		France	United States Cyprus	Bangladesh	
0.14		Germany			France Germany	
0.13	France	United States				Japan
0.12			Libya			
0.11	Indonesia Cambodia	Italy Iceland	Somalia Italy	Somalia		PRC
0.10		UAE		France		Iceland

* Composite Score.

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TABLE 5.17 (Cont)

Value*	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
0.095	Italy					
0.090	Germany		Germany PRC Sudan		Italy	
0.085					Iceland	Cuba
0.080	PRC					
0.075		Sweden PRC		Japan		
0.070			Nigeria Iceland			
0.065	United States	United Kingdom	Sweden			
0.060		So. Yemen	United Kingdom	Germany		Austria
0.055			So. Yemen Cyprus	PRC	PRC	
0.050		Guinea			Turkey	
0.045		Somalia	Turkey			
0.040	N. Korea			Austria		
0.035		Austria				
0.030	United Kingdom Sweden		Austria			Italy
0.025		N. Korea		Italy		
0.020	Guinea		Morocco	Pakistan		Switzerland
0.015			Pakistan			
0.010				N. Korea		
0.005	Mali	Mali Switzerland		N. Vietnam		
0.001	Tunisia				Morocco	
0.000				Mali		

* Composite score.

Limited to countries scoring equal to or higher than zero, this table has combined ordinal country values (identical to those in Table 5.16) and a graphic depiction of relative locational changes among countries.

INTERPRETATION OF DIMENSIONAL SCORES

5.64 Comparison of dimensional scoring results in Table 5.15 reaffirms the multidimensional character of the Soviet foreign involvement profile. With the exception of the first and fourth dimensions (Military Assistance and Political Activity), different sets of countries occupy the top 20 positions in the hierarchy of manifest Soviet involvement.

5.65 The fact that roughly the same groups of countries tend to cluster as the primary recipients of Soviet military and development aid is not altogether surprising. The trend toward a closer integration between the two activities in Soviet involvement has already been observed in this report.

5.66 A similar, although much more limited, parallel clustering of countries also occurred on the second and third dimensions (Military-Commercial Activity and Trade Penetration, respectively). The Eastern European countries scored high as a function of both absolute and proportionate levels of Soviet trade. Given the considerable amount of international trade conducted by the Eastern European nations, this phenomenon is somewhat unusual, since high levels of trade do not frequently coincide with high levels of market penetration. The pervasive dominance of the Soviet Union in the economic affairs of the Comecon nations is confirmed.

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5.67 The use of population figures to control the impact of the relative size of a country on the full magnitude of Soviet involvement is quite evident in the scores on the fifth dimension (Political Visibility). Countries that are generally not in the public eye as prominent targets of Soviet influence seeking share some of the top scores along with recognized areas of high Soviet involvement. Thus, Cyprus outranks all other nations in terms of the number of Soviet embassy personnel per capita and the number of students it sends to Moscow in proportion to its population size. On the basis of the same equation, Iceland vies with the People's Republic of the Congo for the second spot, while Jordan and the People's Republic of Yemen have virtually identical scores and are in, respectively, the fourth and fifth locations on the total hierarchy of Soviet Political Visibility.

5.68 The importance of the noncommunist industrialized world to Soviet diplomacy is highlighted by the country ordering obtained on the sixth dimension (Diplomatic Activity). Of the top 20 countries, only 5 are communist (Poland, Romania, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary). In addition, of the 20, only 3 are considered developing countries (India, Iran, and Pakistan), all three of which border on the Soviet Union.

5.69 The skewed distribution that is evident from the scores indicates the highly focused nature of Soviet involvement in the international system. Instead of diffusing its resources evenly throughout a large number of countries, the Soviet Union has targeted a rather limited number of areas for very high levels of involvement.

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INTERPRETATION OF COMPOSITE SCORES

5.70 The cross-national composite scores in Table 5.16 depict the recent 6-year trend in the relative distribution of Soviet involvement throughout 134 countries. When examining the scores, it is important to consider that they express proportional allocations of Soviet external resources and not absolute values. Thus, the fact that a country shows a score reduction from one year to the next does not necessarily imply a concomitant diminution in the absolute level of Soviet involvement. A helpful analogy is the idea of a Soviet external involvement "pie." A country's annual score reflects its proportionate slice of the pie for that particular year, regardless of whether that year's pie is larger or smaller than the previous year's. From a policy perspective, the annual composite rank ordering may thus be thought of as an annual regional priority list, as seen through Soviet eyes.

5.71 The importance of assessing a foreign country's interests abroad from its own perspective cannot be overemphasized. Too often, U.S. policymakers tend to assume that what is important to the U.S. is also important to the Soviet Union. In addition, the mistake is made frequently of measuring the importance of a certain objective or activity to the Soviet Union by comparing it with its significance to the U.S. Thus, for instance, the depth of Moscow's military commitment to Syria (as measured by the value of military equipment sent) may be compared with the strength of the U.S. guarantee to Israel (measured in terms of the numbers of tanks and aircraft shipped). Clearly, such a comparison is deficient, if only because it fails to account for the

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relative effort involved by either side as part of its worldwide allocation of resources.

5.72 Examination of 6 years of composite scoring results revealed essentially four basic patterns in levels of Soviet manifest interest. The first pattern is a series of countries, including Eastern Europe, Mongolia, Finland, and Afghanistan, that displays very stable levels of interest. Not surprisingly, the countries displaying the most stable levels of Soviet involvement are those on the immediate Soviet periphery, i.e., the buffer states. Presumably, in these areas the question of whether or not to be involved and to what degree is no longer an issue for debate among Soviet decision-makers. The stability in these countries' relationships with the Soviet Union is provided by a broad, intensive network of formal and informal links, including diplomatic treaties, strongly developed commercial interchange, and Soviet military support. As a result, these areas of the world are widely recognized--either implicitly or explicitly--by both friend and foe alike, as being within the legitimate sphere of Soviet security concern.

5.73 The second pattern is a series of countries, including Syria, Guinea, West Germany, and the U.S., that displays a prominent trend toward growing Soviet involvement. In the case of the latter two countries, the growing Soviet involvement is a clear manifestation of U.S.-Soviet detente and West German "Ostpolitik." Statistically, the growing U.S. and West German scores are driven primarily by the virtual explosion in Soviet imports from both countries and the quick succession of formal treaties that have been concluded in recent years.

5.74 The rapid upward movement of Syria on the Soviet interest scale parallels the relative decline of Egypt for the same time period. This trend provides support for the view that the Soviet leadership made a deliberate decision to switch the principal target of its Middle East policy from Cairo to Damascus.

5.75 The upward rise of Guinea is presumably a reflection of the increasing importance of the country to Soviet naval and air mobility. Soviet naval port calls to the port of Conakry, for instance, climbed by almost 1,300%, from 35 in 1970 to 447 3 years later.

5.76 The third pattern is a series of countries that displays a prominent trend toward decreasing Soviet involvement. These countries include Cuba, the Sudan, North Yemen, Iran, and Egypt. Of the five countries showing a distinct decline in the relative level of the Soviet interest, Cuba is the most interesting example. Again, it is to be recalled that the scores reflect the relative standings of countries vis-a-vis each other and are not a measure of the absolute volume of Soviet activity. In the case of Cuba, therefore, the downward movement reflects a relative redistribution of Soviet external resources away from Cuba, even though, in absolute terms, Soviet involvement may actually have undergone an increase. In any event, the decline of Cuba on the hierarchy of Soviet worldwide involvement may help explain Cuba's recent overtures toward improved relations with the United States.

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5.77 The fourth pattern is a series of countries, including Algeria, the Congo, Turkey, and Iran, that displays a highly erratic pattern of Soviet involvement. Soviet involvement in these four countries has tended to undergo substantial fluctuations from year to year, although the general trend appears to be directed toward an increase. The reason for the almost cyclical movement of the Soviet interest is unclear. In part, it may reflect a certain degree of hesitation on the part of both Moscow and the four countries at entering into more solid commitments.

5.78 From the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, it would seem that those areas where the Soviet Union does not appear to have stabilized its interest offer an evident opportunity for the U.S. to maximize its advantage.

CONCLUSION

5.79 Someone once observed that statistics are interesting not so much for what they reveal, as for what they do not reveal. It has been the purpose of this report to seek out the significance of the thousands of individual pieces of information on Soviet external behavior that are collected routinely by Western government agencies. More particularly, it has been the premise of this study that important characteristics of the Soviet interest abroad may be measured meaningfully through a systematic analysis of observable patterns of Soviet involvement.

5.80 Six years of Soviet external activity across a spectrum of indicator data have been examined so that the functional structure of manifest Soviet involvement abroad might be

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better understood. Statistics alone can never give the political decision-maker the tools he needs to develop responsive planning and policies. At best, statistics may sharpen his judgment and perhaps, in some cases, lead him to question otherwise commonly accepted premises and propositions. This study has hopefully contributed to this goal by spelling out the functional composition and interrelatedness among the different instruments of Soviet foreign activity and by developing a systematic framework for examining apparent Soviet external policy priorities. If the study has improved knowledge of Soviet external behavior, it will have served its purpose.

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